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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Venice played a direct role in 
shaping the future of Northeastern Italy. The standing scholarship views Venetian 
involvement on the mainland as either an abandonment of the city’s maritime tradition or 
as a buffer zone against rival powers, like Milan. Venice’s western mainland empire, 
Terraferma, provided Venice with many commercial products that the Eastern 
Mediterranean did not. One mainland product, timber, was a central focus of Venetian 
expansion into Terraferma and has thus far been neglected by historians. This thesis 
argues that the Venetian Republic manipulated mainland legal traditions in order to 
obtain direct control over the forest resources of Terraferma. 
The pressures placed upon Venice by timber shortages and rival powers in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries instigated a departure from Venice’s passive 
management of mainland cities and encouraged the city to strengthen its defenses through 
territorial expansion and forest conservation policies. Timber acquired from Terraferma 
was one of the vital sinews that bound the Venetian military and mercantile machine 
together. In order to directly control the mainland’s timber resources, the Venetians 
inserted their usufructory claims into the legal traditions of mainland communities.  
Archival sources and primary histories illustrate that Venetian forest policy 
evolved from cordial requests for timber into legal statutes that controlled local 
communities’ access to timber stands. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and Negroponte 
 ix 
in 1471 opened a window of opportunity, into which the Venetians inserted the mainland 
legal concept of “right to reserve,” diritto di reserva, in order to expand and formalize 
their legal claims to Terraferma common forestland.  The promulgation of six forest laws 
in 1476 punctuated the development of Venetian forest law in the fifteenth century. The 
laws governed the usage of forest resources and placed the Venetians in direct control of 
all of Terraferma’s community forests.  
The Venetians answered the question “Who owns the forest?” through the 
development of forest laws that placed timber ownership directly with a centralized 
government. The question easily expands into “Who owns the land, and all of its natural 
resources?” American natural resource managers and NGOs continue to develop the 
American answer to the question. The Venetian forest narrative provides us with one 
possible answer to the question that elicits further conversations. Understanding Venice’s 
domination of mainland cities for ship-timber may also elicit further insight into how and 
why modern states dominate their neighbors for natural resources.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Venice invincible, the Adriatic wonder, admired of all the world for power and 
glory, whom no ambitious force could yet bring under, is here presented…” 
~ Maurice Kiffen (1599)1 
Four warhorses of gilded copper arrayed in the quadriga stand as proud sentinels 
of St. Mark’s Square. The horses symbolize much more than a piece of inspiring art for 
visitors within St. Mark’s Basilica. Their story is the story of Venice. St. Mark’s horses, 
like Venice, began their journey as a Byzantine possession. The saffron chargers 
witnessed the apex and collapse of the Byzantine Empire. The Venetians captured the 
quadriga from Constantinople’s Hippodrome when crusaders sacked the city in 1204 C.E. 
The horses most likely originated on the Island of Chios and symbolized Byzantine 
control over the Aegean Islands and the larger Hellenic world.  
As the Classical embodiment of victory, the horses are not only a symbol of 
Venice’s liberation from the Byzantines, but also symbolize Venice’s replacement of 
Constantinople as the dominant force in the Eastern Mediterranean. Warfare and 
commerce produced St. Mark’s horses and the Venetian Empire. Venice dominated the 
Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries by 
controlling the waters of the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean. Secure mainland 
supplies of timber contributed to the maintenance of Venetian maritime power. 
                                                 
1 Gasparo Contarini, The Common-Wealth and Gouernment of Venice, trans. Lewes Lukanor (London: 
Imprinted by John Windet for Edmund Mattes, 1599), 4. 
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Safeguarding stands of timber required Venice to establish a land-based empire that 
dominated mainland polities. Yet, the prevailing historical scholarship grants the basis of 
Renaissance Venetian power to its eastern maritime empire.2  
Venice’s Aegean and Adriatic possessions were an essential part of the 
Republic’s empire, but this limited focus on Venice’s vast web of eastern maritime 
possessions leaves out a part of the Venetian narrative. Venetian scholarship highlights 
Venice’s naval empire and neglects its role in shaping Northern Italian history. 
Terraferma, Venice’s western mainland empire, provided Venice with many commercial 
products that the Eastern Mediterranean did not. One of the more important Terraferma 
products was ship-grade timber for the Arsenale. Most of the existing historical 
scholarship on Venetian Terraferma views Venice’s expansion onto the mainland as an 
extension of the Republic’s political and commercial power, yet it was also an extension 
of Venetian legal tradition.  
The Venetian annexation of mainland polities did not grant Venice direct control 
of Terraferma timber supplies. The incorporation of a timber polity into Terraferma 
reaffirmed the Arsenale’s usufructory rights to a given city’s timber and laid the 
foundation for future legal claims. The Venetians began to move towards directly 
controlling the timber resources of Terraferma in the early fifteenth century by 
establishing a legal precedent for the Arsenale’s claim to timber. Venice ultimately 
gained legal control of Terraferma common forests by building upon this legal precedent 
and by using the advance of the Ottoman Empire to invoke the “right to reserve” (Dirrito 
                                                 
2 Roger Crowley, City of Fortune: How Venice Ruled the Seas (New York: Random House, 2011); F. C. 
Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
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di reserva) forest stands for the defense of Terraferma’s liberty. Venetian acquisitions of 
mainland common timberlands came at the expense of local inhabitants, but resulted in 
positive forest conservation measures. 
Several Venetian specialists successfully illustrated how the Venetians interacted 
with their natural environment.3 Historians tend to focus on Venice’s unquestionable 
connection to water. Water is a contradictory element for Venice and historians 
acknowledge that the Venetian natural environment is defined by hydrological 
dichotomies.4 The lagoons simultaneously provided the Venetians with a constant sense 
of anxiety and an overwhelming feeling of security. The acqua alta, or “high water,” 
periodically flooded the city, whereas the lagoons also provided the city with its strongest 
defense against land-based assaults.  
However, submerged under Venice and within the historical scholarship is a 
natural resource that also molded the Venetian narrative.  Timber in the form of wooden 
stilts provides the foundation for Venice. It was one of several natural resources that 
supported the Venetian Empire. Wood was quite simply the undisputed monarch of 
natural resources in the preindustrial age.5 Timber acquired from Terraferma was one of 
the vital sinews that bound the Venetian military and mercantile machine together. Yet, 
few scholars acknowledge Venice’s dependency on wood products and even fewer 
                                                 
3 F. C. Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1934); Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, Venise Triomphante: Les Horizons d’un mythe (Seyssel: Les 
editions Champ Vallon, 1997); Karl Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea: Environmental Expertise in Renaissance 
Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
4 The most prominent studies on the Venetian perception of water can be found in the collection edited by 
C. A. Fletcher and T. Spencer, Flooding and Environmental Challenges for Venice and its Lagoon: State of 
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 Karl Appuhn, “Environmental Politics and State Power in early modern Venice, 1300–1650” (PhD 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1999). 
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examine the role ship-timber played in the development and maintenance of the Venetian 
empire.  
Terraferma refers to the Venetian mainland territories between the Adda River in 
the west and the Julian March. It is the term historians employ to refer to Venice’s 
mainland Italian possessions. Terraferma is simply an abbreviation of the Venetian title 
Domini di Terraferma, “the mainland dominions.” Venice’s Italian mainland possessions 
centered north of the Po River formed the bulk of Terraferma. The lucrative eastern trade 
routes certainly filled Venetian coffers, yet timber served as the vector of Venetian 
commerce. Establishing that Venice acquired most of its ship-timber from Terraferma 
provides some insight into the Venetian mind.6 An exploration of Venice’s motivations 
for establishing Terraferma, coupled with studying how Venice dominated periphery 
polities for ship-timber, reveals a corpus of forest law and a form of governmental control 
of a natural resource that were unparalleled throughout Renaissance Italy. 
Venice’s forest control is unparalleled among the Italian maritime republics 
because no other Italian power succeeded at manipulating forest law and designating 
forest reserves as successfully as the Venetians. The four maritime republics of Italy, 
Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi depended upon timber for securing and defending 
commercial ties throughout the Mediterranean. The Genoese Republic did not control its 
sting of forests along the Ligurian coast and relied upon private shipbuilders for their 
naval needs.7 Amalfi controlled portions of the timber market, but the relative aridity of 
                                                 
6  The existing Venetian forest history scholarship clearly establishes that it was highly likely that Venetian 
timber supplies came from Terraferma and Istria: cf. Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea; Lane, Venetian Ships; 
Russell Mieggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982); and John Perlin, A Forest Journey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989). 
7 Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 31–32.  
5 
 
Campania limited local timber supplies.8 Even during Pisa’s era of naval dominance in 
the eleventh century, the Pisans did not designate timber reserves to conquered regions. 
Pisa concerned itself with the export of timber to wealthy Islamic ports on the Northern 
African coast in the Levant.9 
Focusing on Venetian forest policy in Terraferma is an excellent avenue for 
studying Italian Renaissance natural resource management for several reasons. The 
breadth of available primary sources is a major consideration for studying Venice. Both 
Pisa and Amalfi based their commercial livelihood on maritime trade and required 
supplies of timber for ship construction, but would be less suitable for an inquiry into 
timber management techniques because of the lack of primary accounts of forest laws 
and policies. Venetian forest history is well documented in the Venetian State Archives 
(Archivio di Stato di Venezia, henceforth referred to as ASV), mainland communal 
archives, and in numerous primary sources.10 
Secondly, Terrraferma forest regulation is an example of preindustrial natural 
resource conservation that contributes to the established environmental historical 
scholarship. Many environmental histories are modern histories that strictly examine the 
exertion of economic pressures upon environmental systems. William Cronon examined 
how American capitalism shaped Colonial New England’s environment, and Carolyn 
                                                 
8 Tommaso Astarita, Between Salt Water and Holy Water: A History of Southern Italy (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 2006), 62. 
9 David Jacoby, Commercial Exchange across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt, 
and Italy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 106.  
10 The best records of Venice’s forest history can be found in: Amministrazione Forestale Veneta 1116–
1811, Fondo IT ASVe 0615 003, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice; and the Esecutori delle 
Deliberazioni Senato del Terra, Fondo IT ASVe 0710, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice. 
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Merchant illustrated capitalism’s role in the mechanization of America’s environment.11 
As Karl Appuhn successfully argues, this capitalistic interpretation does not apply well to 
Renaissance Venice.12 He argues that this capitalistic interpretation blames western 
rationalism for wide-spread environmental change throughout the world and in colonial 
enterprises. Venice provides an example of environmental change wrought by 
modifications to legal codes prior to the rise of western rationalism.   
Alfred Crosby called for an ecological explanation for environmental change in 
the “Neo-Europes.”13 Crosby asserted that the Europeans conquered the “Neo-Europes” 
through ecological imperialism. Crosby challenged environmental historians to 
contemplate how biological agents modified nature. The scientific rationale is an 
important aspect of environmental change, but the modification of environmental systems 
is a combination of ecological and cultural factors. Law is another expression of culture 
that directly influences nature. Venice’s seizure of Terraferma’s ship-timber was a form 
of legal imperialism through the enactment of legal statutes that placed restraints on 
forest usage by Terraferma polities. Such a notion makes Venice not only an intriguing 
case study, but also a study that contributes to more clearly established environmental 
narratives. 
Lastly, Venice’s unique geography required the Venetians to modify their natural 
surroundings from the foundation of the city. The Venetian Lagoon’s role as the estuary 
                                                 
11 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: 
Macmillan, 1983); Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New 
England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 
12 Appuhn, “Environmental Politics,” 11.  
13 Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 2E (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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of the Sile and Brenta rivers and its position as a bay within the Adriatic posed 
hydrological obstacles throughout Venetian history. The Venetian Republic’s survival 
rested solely upon the city’s ability to control the hydrology of the lagoons and the Po 
River watershed. Venetian environmental policy was directly tied into the livelihood of 
the city. The Venetians often implemented timber in order to solve the dangers of living 
in the middle of an ever-changing, live hydrological system. Timber was one of several 
crucial natural resources that Venice dominated in order to sustain its insular position. 
The control of wheat and salt also played a prominent role in the maintenance of the 
Venetian Empire, but as of yet, no historian has examined how Venice manipulated legal 
tradition to control timber. 
This new legal history of Venice’s timber resources follows the accepted 
chronology of the Venetian Empire, but ends with Venice’s legal domination of all 
common Terraferma timberland in 1476. The chronology of the Venetian empire is 
typically organized into three different phases. The first phase (1204-1380) is defined by 
Venice’s expansion of influence over the Adriatic. Venice’s involvement in the 
dismantlement of the Byzantine Empire in 1204 cemented Venice as an international 
power. Economic rivalry with Genoa dominated the narrative after 1204. This 
antagonism between Genoa and Venice resulted in the War of Chioggia in 1378. The 
victory over the Genoese in 1380 granted Venice control over the Adriatic and Eastern 
Mediterranean whilst severely handicapping the naval capabilities of their staunchest 
rival. The War of Chioggia served as a springboard for Venetian expansion onto the 
Italian mainland and Venice’s eventual control of timber resources. 
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A long fifteenth century (1380–1509) serves as the focal point of the second 
phase of Venetian history. Venice departed from its passive management of the mainland 
by the execution of the Carraresi in 1406. This demonstrated Venice’s commitment to the 
security of the mainland and its timber resources. Venice extended its control over 
Terraferma with the annexation of Bergamo in 1428. The Venetian expansion into 
Terraferma incited anxiety in other mainland powers. Florence, Milan, and Hungaria all 
came into direct conflict with Venice over its expansion onto the mainland. This anxiety 
culminated with the War of the League of Cambrai in 1509. Although not covered in this 
thesis, the third phase of Venetian imperial history began in 1509 and extended to the war 
of Candia and the loss of Crete to the Ottoman Empire in the 1570s. 
The development of Venetian forest law centers upon Venice’s conquest of 
Terraferma and the development of mainland forest law in the late fourteenth through the 
fifteenth century. Venetian forest policy provides scholarship with a unique periodization 
of Venetian Terraferma. This inquiry divides the narrative of Venetian Terraferma into 
two periods. I begin with how conflict with Genoa and surrounding rival states 
encouraged Venice to promulgate the earliest forms of timber management in the middle 
of the fourteenth century. The work then transitions into an overview of the Venetian 
conquest of Terraferma between 1378 and 1428. The steady growth of Venetian 
intervention into mainland affairs dominates the narrative. The promulgation of forest 
law was part of a larger pattern of increasing Venetian influence over the mainland. The 
execution of the Carraresi family in 1406 serves as the turning point for the first chapter 
and clearly marks the beginning of Venice’s commitment to Terraferma. The annexation 
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of Bergamo in 1428 established the boundaries of Terraferma and concluded the first 
period of Venetian forest history. 
The second section of Venetian forest history serves as the focus of the third 
chapter of this thesis. This section is defined by the development and implementation of 
Venetian forest policy between 1410 and 1476.  Firm transition dates must be used with 
caution, yet 1410 marks the beginning of Venice’s attempt to directly control 
Terraferma’s ship-timber supplies. Venetian forest policy evolved from cordial requests 
for timber into legal statutes that controlled local communities’ access to timber stands. 
Doge Michele Steno first requested timber from Belluno in 1410. Venetian timber policy 
evolved into six 1476 forest laws that directly controlled how local communities could 
use forest resources.  
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first section examines the Venetian 
expansion into Terraferma in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The 
annexation of Terraferma polities did not grant full authority over timber resources to the 
Venetians. The Roman legal tradition of the mainland required the Venetians to insert 
their timber interests into mainland legal codes, thus the second part of this thesis 
examines how Venetian forest policy and law developed to control the timber supplies of 
Venice’s newfound mainland empire. The brief conclusion reveals how this thesis might 
inform future research and proposes that the Venetian forest law possesses valuable 
lessons for modern forest users and policymakers.  
******************* 
Ship-timber was a constant military necessity for Venice and its state-operated 
shipyard, the Arsenale. Although Arsenale-grade timber came from Istria and the 
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Dalmatian coast, Terraferma stands supplied Venice with most of its ship-timber.14 
Therefore, Venice’s military expansion into Terraferma is the appropriate starting point 
for examining the Republic’s system of state controlled forests. The Venetian push onto 
the Italian mainland in the early fifteenth century was likely due, in part, to a need of 
steady timber supplies for the Arsenale. The requirement of a steady supply of Arsenale-
grade timber may not have been the most crucial reason, and certainly was not the only 
driving force behind the Venetian expansion into Terraferma. Yet, the historical 
discussion on Terraferma has thus far excluded timber.  
Unlike capitalism in New England or biological colonization in the Neo-Europes, 
the Venetian Republic’s control of ship-timber resources illustrates how the decline of 
natural resources does not have to possess negative undertones. Venice provides an 
example of a society that noticed deforestation and attempted to implement positive 
conservation policies. My discussion of Venice’s conquest of Terraferma will be 
followed by an inquiry into how Venice inserted its interests in timber into the 
Terraferma’s legal heritage. Venice secured stands of Arsenale-grade timber largely 
through enacting environmental public policy. Shortages of Terraferma timber 
throughout the fourteenth and into the early fifteenth century resulted in the opening of a 
policy window. 15 Venetian forest policy was a progressive attempt by an Italian Republic 
                                                 
14 Lane, Venetian Ships, 224–226; cf. Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 44. 
15 A policy window or window of opportunity is a phase of policy formulation. A random problem window 
is a type of policy window that describes the Venetian timber situation. These occur when a jarring or 
traumatic event causes policy-makers to focus their attention on remedying the cause of the calamity. A 
good definition comes from Melody Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville: “random events or 
crises open unpredictable windows that can allow opportunities for new actors to influence the policy 
formulation process.” Melody Hessing, Michael Howlett, and Tracy Summerville, Canadian Natural 
Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2005), 172. 
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to conserve a natural resource for military use that resulted in the creation of Italy’s first 
state forest reserves. 
The story of St. Mark’s horses closely mirrors the Venetian narrative. Venice’s 
preference of a quadriga of horses, terrestrial animals, instead of the traditional animal 
that denoted sea power, hippocampi, embodied Venice’s domination of not only the 
Eastern Mediterranean, but also the communities of Terraferma and the Po River Valley. 
It is quite fitting to mark the ultimate decline of Venetian prominence with the seizure of 
the quadriga by French forces in 1797.  Ultimately the central purpose of this inquiry is to 
examine what modern scholars and policymakers can learn from the Venetian forest 
narrative.  
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CHAPTER I: “MUCH NEW GROUND CAN BE WON”:  
VENETIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This thesis fits into two traditions of Venetian historiography. The first, and 
broader of the two traditions, focuses on Venetian Terraferma. Although more Venetian 
histories grant the Republic’s maritime ventures primacy, a growing number of histories 
strictly examine Venetian Terraferma. The second tradition is the legal history of the 
Republic. Venetian legal histories chart the origins of Venice’s legal heritage, and 
examine how the Republic applied this heritage within the city itself and to its dominions. 
The historiography for Venetian law is quite limited, thus this thesis will contribute forest 
law to the greater discussion of Venetian history.  
The narrative of Venetian forest law and policy in fourteenth and fifteenth century 
Terraferma is also a forest history. The arguments of this thesis contribute to the field of 
forest history by illustrating how Venice shaped the ownership of Terraferma forests. 
Very few forest histories examine pre-industrial forests and even fewer examine how 
legal traditions shaped arboreal ownership. Furthermore, many forest histories illustrate 
how ecological processes modify forests whilst neglecting the influence of cultural 
systems, such as law.  
13 
 
Venice: The Myth and Antimyth 
Historians have mused over the city of St. Mark for numerous generations. The 
earliest histories of Venice originated in the mediaeval period.16 Historians penned these 
early histories in the classical style and were commissioned by the Venetian patriciate.17 
Written in Latin, very few Venetians held access to the narrative of their own culture. 
Although state-sponsored political histories were most common, Marino Sanuto’s late 
fifteenth to early sixteenth century Diarii chronicled the daily lives of Venetians from all 
ranks in society. The commissioned “official” Venetian histories dominated the Venetian 
narrative well into the nineteenth century.18 
The origin of modern Venetian historiography lies with the Venetian histories 
written just after the collapse of the Republic in 1797. The opening of the ASV after the 
1848 revolutions resulted in a proliferation of Venetian historians. Sameuele Romanin 
penned a multi-volume Venetian history in 1861. Romanin, a product of Venice’s 
historical Jewish population, is a notable example of a Venetian-born historian defending 
the myths of Venice. Romanin viewed the fall of Venice as “an inescapable consequence 
                                                 
16 See for example: Giovanni Diacono, Cronaca Veneziana, ed. Mario de Biasi, 2 vols. (Venice: Ateneo 
Veneto, 1988), which is thought to have been written in c. 1053; Andrea Dandolo, Chronicon Venetum, 
eds. Ludovico Muratori and Filippo Argelati (Milan: Societas Palatina, 1728), which covers the years 
1200–1339 and is believed to have been written in 1339.  
17 This is especially the case for: Marc Antonio Coccio “Sabellico,” Rerum Venetarum ab urbe condita libri 
(Basel: Joannis König, 1556); Pietro Giustinian, Rerum Venetarum ab urbe condita (Venice: Ludovico 
Auantium, 1575); cf. T. Livius, Ab Urbe Condita.  
18  Examples of state commissioned historians abound: Marino Sanuto, Diarii, eds. Guglielmo Berchet, 
Nicolò Barozzi, and Marco Allegri (Forni: Federico Visenti, 1908) believed to have been written in 1533; 
Pietro Bembo, Historiae venetae (Venice: Aldus Fils, 1551); and Paolo Paruta, Historia venetiana (Venice: 
Domenico Nicolini, 1605). 
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of the autonomies and rights that, regrettably, Venice granted its subjects.”19 To 
Romanin, the Venetians were too benevolent and granted too many rights to annexed 
polities. This notion of Venice granting rights to dependent polities is explored further 
below within the discussion of Venice’s administration of state forests within its Italian 
domains. 
F.C. Hodgson published his multi-volume history of Venice in the early twentieth 
century.20 Heinrich Kretschmayr, an Austrian historian, produced three volumes of 
Venetian history from 1905 to 1933.21 Kretshmayr focused on Venetian religion, culture, 
industry, and law. His work granted the German-speaking world its initial insight into 
Venetian history. The Byzantine historian Charles Diehl published a Venetian History in 
French in 1915. Diehl examined the relationship between Venice and its mother city, 
Constantinople.22 Hodgson, Kretshmayr, and Diehl signify the branching out of Venetian 
historiography during the early twentieth century. 
Hodgson, Kretshmayr, and Diehl all upheld the “myth of Venice.” The myth of 
Venice is a form of Venetian exceptionalism. The myth asserts that the Venetian 
Republic is a model for all Republics. Likewise, the myth holds that the city strictly 
upheld its Republican virtues of liberty, unity, and guardianship. The Venetians 
established their city upon maritime capitalism with liberties present in no other Italian 
                                                 
19 Claudio Pavolo, “The Creation of Venetian Historiography,” in Venice Reconsidered: The History and 
Civilization of an Italian city-state 1297–1797, eds. John Martin and Dennis Romano (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 503. 
20 F. C. Hodgson, The Early History of Venice: From the Foundation to the Conquest of Constantinople 
(London: G. Allen and Sons, 1901), and Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, 1204–1400 
(London: G. Allan and Sons, 1910). 
21 Heinrich Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig: Bd. Die Blüte, vol. 1 (Gotha, DE: Friedrich Andreas 
Perthes, 1905). Followed by volume 2 in 1920 and volume 3 in 1933. 
22 Charles Diehl, Venise: Une république patricienne (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1915). 
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city and never witnessed foreign domination. The Venetians were a “unified and civic-
minded patriciate.”23 Lastly, the Venetian Republic served as the protector of the liberties 
of Terraferma polities. Venice as the protector of the mainland is the most important 
concept for this inquiry because the Venetians used their role as guardian of the liberties 
of the mainland in order to enact forest law that stripped some of the freedoms previously 
enjoyed by mainland cities. 
The interpretation of the myth of Venice provided by Venetian histories is divided 
into two camps: the historians who bolster the anti-myth and the scholars who support the 
myth. The anti-myth camp, established by Vincenzo Marchesi, asserted that the imagery 
of the political freedom within the Venetian Empire was false. Marchesi claimed that 
Venice behaved like “Italy’s other major powers, that is, in treating the conquered cities 
as subjects while leaving them their ancient constitutions and autonomies. The Republic 
contented itself with making of the cities friendly subjects but never allowed them to 
participate in its life, or never shared power with them.”24 Marchesi’s interpretation of 
the Venetian-Terraferma relationship is a bit hyperbolic, but it is an interpretation that 
still holds merit. The Venetians never granted citizenship to the residents of an annexed 
polity and only rarely allowed mainland ruling families to become citizens, most notably 
Francesco Novello of the Carraresi family.  
Pompeo Molmenti, a native Venetian, established the other camp. Molmenti was 
a staunch nationalist and the Risorgimento of 1860’s Italy influenced his substantial 
                                                 
23 James S. Grubb, “When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of Venetian Historiography,” The Journal of 
Modern History 58, no. 1 (March 1986): 44. 
24 Vincenzo Marchesi, Settant’ anni della di Storia di Venezia: 1798–1866, trans. Paolo Squatriti (Rome: L. 
Roux, 1892), 505–507. 
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work. He argued for Venetian Republican exceptionalism. Like Rawdon Brown, 
Molmenti perceived Venice as an organism. He divided its history into “Le orgini,” the 
genesis of the city, “Le splendore,” Venice’s era of imperial dominion, and “Le 
decadimento,” the era of decadent decline. Molmenti’s periodization of Venice can still 
be seen in how modern Venetian historians organize Venetian history. Molmenti’s work 
veered away from the traditional political narrative of Venice and focused on Venetian 
cultural and social themes.25 
Many of the early nineteenth century Venetian histories that upheld the myth of 
Venice were nationalistic tracts. Bruno Dudan, in his Il dominio veneziano di levante, 
incorporated Venice’s former imperial possessions in Illyria as a justification for a 
modern Italian colony in Dalmatia.26 The interwar narratives largely ignored the role of 
Venice’s natural environment and instead glorified Venetian political and legal 
domination of mainland polities. Many Italian historians “prostituted their pens to the 
cause of ultranationalistic history.”27 Roberto Cessi was one of the few Italian historians 
who did not allow ultranationalism to influence his interpretation of Venice. Cessi cast a 
more critical eye upon the Venetian Republic and viewed Venetian expansion on the 
mainland as a distraction from the city’s lucrative eastern possessions.28 
Subsequent historians in the twentieth century interpreted the myth of Venice in a 
unique manner. During Mussolini’s rule over Italy, fascist party members honored the 
                                                 
25 Margaret Plant asserts that Molmenti focused on Venetian Arts in Venice: Fragile City 1791–1997 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 103. 
26 Bruno Dadan, Il dominio veneziano di levante (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1938), 149–152. 
27 Charles F. Delzell, “Italian Historical Scholarship: A Decade of Recovery and Development, 1945–
1955,” The Journal of Modern History 28, no. 4 (Dec. 1956): 374. 
28 Roberto Cessi, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia (Florence: Giunti Martello, 1981), 74. 
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Venetians for their commitment to the state and their unwavering legal code.29 During the 
Cold War, some American historians viewed Venice as analogous to the United States. 
F.C. Lane highlighted Venice’s similarities to the American Republic in his presidential 
address to the American Historical Society in 1965.30 Brian Pullan’s work in Crisis and 
Change in the Venetian Economy viewed the Venetian patriciate as the binding element 
in the Republic and upheld the myth’s ideal of Venice as guardian of political 
freedoms.31  
Lane’s encomium of Venice’s Republican virtues greatly differed from the anti-
myth historians. These scholars challenged the myth of Venice after the dismemberment 
of the Venetian Republic in the late eighteenth century at the hands of Napoléon 
Bonaparte. Authors critically questioned Venice’s expansion into Terraferma. Pierre 
Daru’s early nineteenth century work, L’Historie des Républiques de Venise, questioned 
the central myths of the Venetian Republic. Daru critiqued Venetian Republican 
exceptionalism and the myth of the “good republic.” Both Daru and Ugo Foscolo’s Storia 
di Venezia viewed Venice not as the protector of mainland polities, but as an aggressor 
that manipulated mainland communities.32 Both authors questioned Venetian virtues 
likely as an extension of their defense of the French dismantlement of the Venetian 
                                                 
29 Pavolo, “The Creation of Venetian Historiography,” 491. 
30 F. C. Lane, “At the Roots of Republicanism,” The American Historical Review 71, no. 2 (Jan. 1966): 
404–406. 
31  Brian Pullan, introduction to Crisis and Change in The Venetian Economy in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
ed. Brian Pullan (London: Methuen and Co., 1968), 6–14.  
32 Eric R. Dursteler, “A Brief Survey of Histories of Venice,” in A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–
1797, ed. Eric R. Dursteler (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2013), 8. 
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Republic in 1797. Gaetano Cozzi questioned the principle of equality within the Venetian 
ruling class and asserted that Venice was more of an oligarchy than a Republic.33 
The rejection of the myth of Venice is most clearly seen in how historians shifted 
their focus from Venice’s maritime empire to Terraferma. In the mythical representation 
of the Republic, Venice was purely a maritime republic.34 The virtues of the Venetian 
Republic came from its isolation from the mainland and its connection to the sea. The 
Venetians bolstered their imagery as a maritime republic with state ceremonies, such as 
Ascension Day. Every May 29, the Doge ventured out into the Adriatic and cast a golden 
ring into the water to symbolize Venice’s marriage to the sea. Although Ascension Day 
held specific Christian significance on the Italian mainland, for the Venetians the holiday 
was an illustration of maritime and political dominance of the Adriatic.  
Viewing Terraferma timber policy as an important facet of the Venetian Empire 
places this thesis directly into the anti-myth camp. That is, this thesis challenges the 
traditional view (myth) of Venice as a benevolent maritime republic in several ways. 
Venice was not strictly a maritime empire and possessed an important land-based western 
empire. Likewise, asserting that the Venetians passed forest legislation at the expense of 
mainland communities critiques Venice’s claim as protector of Terraferma liberties. This 
thesis questions the myth of Venice by placing greater significance on the Republic’s 
mainland empire and contributes to the historiography of Venetian Terraferma by 
inserting law into the mainland narrative. 
                                                 
33 Gaetano Cozzi, “Authority and the Law in Renaissance Venice,” in Renaissance Venice, ed. J. R. Hale 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 295. 
34 Grubb, “When Myths Lose Power,” 72. 
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Terraferma 
Several pertinent themes dominate the historical narratives of Venetian expansion 
onto the Italian mainland and the establishment of Terraferma. This thesis inserts itself 
into three ongoing debates on Terraferma. The first theme questions the centrality of 
Venice’s maritime empire. As briefly mentioned above, after the decline of Venetian 
State histories, historians began to acknowledge the importance of the mainland within 
Venetian history and governmental institutions. The Italian mainland is an important 
facet in Venetian history because mainland timber sustained Venice’s Eastern maritime 
Empire and played a role in shaping the history of the Po River Valley.   
Writing in the middle of the twentieth century, Roberto Cessi focused on Venice’s 
maritime empire. In his Storia di Venezia, Cessi portrayed the Venetians as a maritime 
people, similar to Genoa or Pisa, but unique in its Republican system of government.35 In 
Cessi’s appraisal, expansion into Terraferma weakened Venice’s hold on eastern 
maritime possessions. Expenditures on continued mainland wars diverted funds necessary 
to stem the ascendancy of the Ottomans.36 Cessi’s history followed the myth of Venice 
by placing more importance on Venetian maritime possessions. 
More recent historians bolstered the myth of Venice and continued to place an 
emphasis on Venice’s maritime exploits. Jan Morris proposed a certain inevitability of 
Venetian maritime prominence by stating that “Venice was clearly destined to be 
something special among the nations.”37 Morris labeled Venice as the commercial and 
maritime hub of the Mediterranean Sea. John Julius Norwich echoed Morris’s focus upon 
                                                 
35 Cessi, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, 234. 
36 Ibid., 325. 
37 Jan Morris, The Venetian Empire: A Sea Voyage (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 18. 
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the sea by beginning his study of Venice with Alcuin’s question “Quid est Mare?-What is 
the Sea?” Alcuin’s answer, “Refugium in periculis-A shelter amidst danger,” summarizes 
Norwich’s appraisal of Venice’s connection to the sea.38 Venetian maritime success 
makes it tempting to view the Republic as strictly a naval empire, but such a perception 
neglects Venice’s mainland empire. By using forest law as an avenue into Terraferma, 
this thesis seeks to add the mainland perspective to the narrative of the Venetian 
Republic.  
The trend of focusing on Terraferma began with late nineteenth century. 
Molmenti situated the Venetian expansion into Terraferma in the early fifteenth century 
as the beginning of the downfall of the republic. He stated that Venetian expansion into 
Terraferma “exhausted the accumulated wealth which should have gone to aid her sea 
power.”39 Molmenti may not have considered how timber, a land-based resource, 
influenced Venice’s maritime fortunes. In order to sustain its maritime power, Venice 
was required to build and administer a land-based empire in Terraferma. Molmenti 
simply did not incorporate how timber supplies may have influenced the Venetian 
perception of the strategic importance of their mainland territories. 
F. C. Lane began to bridge the gap between Venice’s maritime focus and the 
narrative of the mainland in his Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance. 
Lane connected Terraferma timber to the security of Venice’s maritime empire. He stated 
“Venice was dependent upon access to terrestrial products from which the ships were 
                                                 
38 Alcuin, Catechism, quoted in Horatio Forbes Brown, Venetian Studies (London: Keegan Paul Trench and 
Co., 1887), 1. M. Beaudoin translation. 
39 Pompeo Molmenti, Venice, Its Individual Growth from the Earliest Beginnings to the fall of the Republic, 
trans. Horatio Forbes Brown (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1907), 2–3. 
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made.”40 Lane largely focused on Venice’s naval prowess, but by noting the connection 
between timber and naval security he started to connect the “Venetian Myth” and “Anti-
myth” interpretations of Venice’s role as a maritime Republic. This inquiry complements 
Lane’s work as it adds the development of forest law into the discussion of Venetian 
timber resources. 
The second theme attempts to parse why the Venetians expanded onto the 
mainland and how the expansion changed the Venetian government. Two approaches 
developed within the historiography. The first approach views Venetian expansion as an 
unplanned set of opportunistic annexations. M. E. Mallett summarized this approach by 
stating that Venetian Terraferma annexations were haphazard and uncoordinated.41 The 
second approach sees Venetian annexation as a coordinated expansion of Venetian 
commercial ties to the mainland. D. S. Chambers best articulated this second position. He 
stated, “Venetians in the Italian mainland expressed no sudden ambition to gain territory, 
revenues and jurisdiction, but were more concerned with the security of traditional lines 
of commerce.”42 Timber was one of the first commodities Venice extracted from the 
mainland and the mainland timber trade bolstered the connections between Venice and 
mainland communities. The Venetians adapted their methods of annexation to the city 
being incorporated into Terraferma. This second approach fits well within the 
development of Venetian forest law because the forest laws developed to initially 
regulate commerce then evolved to dominate usufructory rights. 
                                                 
40 Lane, Venetian Ships, 217. 
41 M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400–1617 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 161. 
42 David S. Chambers, The Imperial Age of Venice (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), 54. 
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The third theme examines Venice’s claim as protector of the mainland. The “anti-
myth” historians, who question the myth of Venice, accuse the Venetians of reducing the 
rights of Terraferma communities and excluding them from the Republic’s government. 
This vein of Terraferma historiography often argued that Venice inconsistently governed 
mainland polities.43 The historians who attempt to uphold specific parts of the myth of 
Venice, acknowledge that Venice subjugated some polities but claim that such measures 
were atypical. Scholars of this vein could, but do not, cite Venice’s ruthlessness in 
deposing of the Paduan Carraresi family as one of the few cases of Venetian subjugation.  
S. J. Woolf examined Venetian institutional control of small polities in 
Terraferma. Woolf argues that a division between Venice and the provinces widened 
during the middle of the fifteenth century.44 Venice’s relationship with mainland polities 
kept the early Venetian forest legislation less intrusive. The 1476 laws granted the 
Arsenale an extensive amount of power over Terraferma polities and possibly 
contributed to the division between Venice and mainland communities. Venice was 
utterly dependent on mainland communities for its charcoal, wooden pilings, and ship-
timber. The relationship between Venice and its mainland possessions was always 
tenuous. 
Nicolai Rubinstein argued that Venice’s expansion into Terraferma led Florence 
and the Papal States to believe that Venice was positioning itself to establish an Italian 
                                                 
43 Giorgio Chittolini, “The Private, the Public, and the State,” in The Origins of the State in Italy: 1300–
1600, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 37–41. 
44 S. J. Woolf, “Venice and the Terraferma: Problems of the Change from Commercial to Landed 
Activities,” in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, ed. Brian 
Pullan (London: Methuen and Co., 1968), 190. 
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Empire.45 Notable humanists, such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini, echoed this 
appraisal. Rubinstein’s assessment of Venetian-Italian relationships pinpoints one of the 
major reasons why the Italian polities targeted Venice. Machiavelli’s claim that Venice 
was seeking the “monarchy of Italy” was unwarranted.46 One of the driving forces for the 
expansion into Terraferma was Venice’s need for the timber resources of the region and 
not simply imperialism. I will contribute to Rubinstein’s work by inserting the Venetian 
need for timber into the continuing historical dialogue on the Venetian expansion.  
The timber supplies of Terraferma provided an incentive for Venetian expansion 
into the region during the fourteenth century.  However, it would be foolish to assume 
that timber was the only reason for Venetian claims to the Northern Italian mainland. The 
acute need for ship-timber was possibly combined with a desire to maintain a buffer zone 
between Venice and several of its bitter rivals. As M. E. Mallet and J. R. Hale suggested, 
the War of the League of Cambrai revealed Venetian vulnerabilities and prompted the 
city of St. Mark to maintain a buffer zone between Florence, France, the Papal States, and 
the shores of its lagoon.47 Yet, earlier wars with Genoa and Hungaria demonstrated a 
need for Venice to maintain a defensible frontier. The necessity of a buffer zone did not 
detract from Venice’s exploitation of Terraferma’s timber resources. Most likely the 
Venetians used Terraferma in a multi-use capacity. The land served as a string of 
defenses whilst supplying the Venetian Arsenale with ship-timber. 
                                                 
45 Nicolai Rubinstein, “Italian Reactions to Terraferma Expansion in the Fifteenth Century,” in Renaissance 
Venice, ed. J. R. Hale (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), 197. 
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Venetian forest law inserts itself quite well into the debate over Venice’s role as 
protector of the mainland. Venice granted annexed cities a wide range of freedoms, 
including the right to maintain the polity’s legal tradition. However, the development of 
Venetian forest law illustrates a gradual change in Venice’s passive management of the 
legal traditions of Terraferma. Therefore, this thesis contributes to this branch of 
Terraferma historiography by bringing the forest law into the debate. Venetian 
Terraferma forest law illustrates Venice’s evolving management of the mainland in the 
late fourteenth century and administration of Terraferma throughout the fifteenth century.  
Venetian mainland forest law lends itself into the three historiographical branches 
of Terraferma history. The annexation of mainland polities in the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth centuries demonstrates that Venice was not only a maritime but also a 
land-based empire. Like the hydrological connection between the Po River Valley and 
the Adriatic, Venice’s maritime and terrestrial empires depended upon one another and 
should not be excluded from each other within the Venetian narrative. The steady 
development of forest law from simple market control measures upholds Chambers’s 
interpretation of a coordinated Venetian annexation of the mainland. The execution of the 
Carraresi family in 1406 signified Venice’s commitment to the Italian mainland. 
Venetian forest law also belongs in the discussion of the Republic’s claim to the title of 
Terraferma’s protector. Although the forest laws dispossessed mainland communities 
from some of their forests, the laws also promulgated positive conservation reforms to 
mainland harvest practices.  
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Law: Roman vs. Byzantine Legal Foundations of Venetian Law 
Adding the narrative of forest law to previous discussions of Venetian legal 
systems contributes to the historiography in four ways. First, Hazlitt, Kretschmayr, and 
Hodgson mistakenly placed Venice’s legal heritage solely with mainland Roman 
institutions. Venetian forest law possessed both Byzantine and Roman legal elements. 
Second, it is also inappropriate to discard any Roman influence in Venetian law. The 
Venetians implemented Roman legal concepts such as res publica, ager publici, and 
civitas to formulate the legal precedence for new restrictions on forest use.48 Third, a 
study of Venetian forest law complements previous examinations of Venice’s legal 
control of natural resources. Venice’s legal domination of Adriatic wheat markets 
displayed the Republic’s willingness to use law to control natural resources. Lastly, the 
development of Venetian forest law demonstrates that the Venetians structured their laws 
within the mainland’s legal traditions. 
The historiography of Venetian law fits within the larger discussion of the myth 
of Venice. Although Venetian historians often included a discussion on law within their 
broader surveys of Venetian history, none specifically focuses on the overall 
development of Venetian law. One of the earliest authors to comment on Venetian law 
was William Carew Hazlitt. Writing in the nineteenth century, Hazlitt connected the 
“remarkable institutions” of Venetian law to the city’s Republican nature.49 By doing so, 
Hazlitt did not critique the myth of Venice.  
                                                 
48 Res publica- “Matters of the public,” ager publici- “Public fields/land,” civitas “citizenship, membership 
in a city” 
49 William Carew Hazlitt, History of the Venetian Republic: Her Rise, Her Greatness, and Her Civilization 
(London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1860), 293–297. 
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F. C. Hodgson and Kretschmayr also coupled the Venetian legal system into the 
myth of Venetian Republican virtue.50 Hodgson tied Venetian law into the Roman legal 
tradition.51 Such an assertion falls into the ongoing debate around the origins of Venetian 
law. Most scholars conclude that Venetian law was the product of Roman, Byzantine, and 
various mainland legal traditions, but disagree on which legal heritage influenced the city 
the most.52 Attaching Venice to the Roman legal tradition upholds an aspect of the myth 
of Venice that viewed the Republic as a successor to the Roman Republic/Empire.  
William Bouwsma asserted that part of Venice’s legal uniqueness stemmed from 
its rejection of medieval imperial law.53 The incorporation of mainland Italian 
communities into the Holy Roman Empire bolstered their Roman legal tradition. In 
roughly the same time period (eighth to tenth centuries C.E.), Constantinople dominated 
Venetian cultural and political systems. As a result, Venetian law incorporated the 
flexibility of Byzantine legal systems. Bouwsma asserted that the Venetians never cited 
Roman law.54 Yet, Terraferma forest law is an excellent example of the Venetians 
manipulating Roman legal tradition to secure a natural resource and it is therefore most 
appropriate to see Venetian law as the product of Byzantine legal traditions and, with 
exposure to the mainland, also influenced by Roman legal code.   
                                                 
50 Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, vol. 1, 325. 
51 Hodgson, The Early History of Venice, 344. 
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54 Ibid.  
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William McNeill contributed to the debate surrounding Venetian legal traditions 
as well. Although McNeill is best known for his works in world history and 
epidemiological history, his contribution to Venetian historiography should not be 
overlooked.55 McNeill examined how the Venetians implemented a system of 
commercial laws in order to dominate the Adriatic’s wheat trade. Venetian law required 
any exportation of wheat to first pass through Venice before reaching its final 
destination.56 Lane also noted that the Venetians established a regulatory system to fine 
merchants who did not first unload their wheat in Venice.57  Therefore, this thesis 
contributes another example of the Venetian implementation of law as a means to control 
a natural resource. 
McNeill’s work is also noteworthy for this inquiry because he proposed that from 
the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century Venice was the cultural hinge of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. He stated that Venice and the Venetians were the “principal 
mediators and links between the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Sea regions.”58 It is 
important to remember that Venice was not only one of the cultural conduits of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, but it was also the cultural center for its mainland Italian 
possessions. Forest law provides a window into how Venetian legal systems served as a 
mediator of Terraferma communities.   
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Although Roman law served as the foundation for mainland Italian legal 
traditions, legal diversity typified Terraferma community statutes (contadi). Gaetano 
Cozzi suggested that a “legal diaphragm” existed between Venice and Terraferma 
communities. Mainland legal traditions were technical, rigid, and not predisposed to 
adapting to empirical review, whereas Venetian law adapted to fit the legal diversity of 
the mainland and was flexible enough to incorporate regulatory systems for mainland 
commerce including timber. Cozzi’s “diaphragm” could be more accurately labeled as a 
tension between Terraferma and Venetian laws. The structure of early fifteenth century 
Venetian forest law indicates that Venice was aware of this tension and molded their 
legal claims to mainland timber to fit within the mainland’s legal traditions.59  
Venice used the legal traditions of the mainland in order to dominate the key 
natural resource for the production of ships. The Venetians exploited the forest resources 
of the mainland. Venetian mainland forest law developed from the Republic’s Byzantine 
legal heritage, but incorporated Roman legal elements when the Venetians manipulated 
mainland contadi. Venetian forest law illustrated the Republic’s adaptability to 
Terraferma legal traditions and provides a new perspective on the Venetian expansion on 
the mainland. 
Forests: Grafting Timber into the Venetian Narrative 
Forest histories are a recent development, and very few forest law histories exist. 
More recently the historical scholarship on forests has thrived. Forest history is, as 
Russell Meiggs once mused, “a field which is too important to be ignored and in which 
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much new ground can be won.” By contributing my Venetian forest narrative to the well 
established histories of Venice I hope that I can conquer a small portion of this untaken 
ground. 
In the inter-war period, French and American historians began to examine how 
the environment of Northeastern Italy influenced the Venetian historical narrative. One of 
the originators of the Annales school, Lucien Febvre, began the modern tradition of 
Venetian forest histories. Febvre believed that the forests of the Mediterranean rapidly 
declined in the classical era.60  He asserted that the oak forests of the Po River Valley, 
which supported the Venetian Empire, were numerous before the Roman era. 
According to Febvre, the aptitude for a culture to take up the “maritime spirit” 
depended largely on their natural environment. Timber was a natural mainland product 
that sustained the Venetian “maritime spirit.” Such a suggestion can be very easily 
labeled as deterministic. However, Febvre’s approach to Venetian maritime prowess is a 
not a form of environmental determinism because he asserted that the Venetian expansion 
along the Dalmatian coast was not geographically inevitable.61 Febvre cited the lagoon-
hamlet of Poitevin Marais, in France’s Aunis province, as an example of another, less 
successful marshland community. Febvre credited the discovery of new trading routes by 
the Portuguese as the dominant cause of the decline in Venetian fortunes in the sixteenth 
century.62 This argument fits well within Febvre’s larger assertion on the importance of 
maritime trade routes. The discovery of new spice trade routes by the Portuguese 
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certainly influenced the decline of Venice, but it was not the sole cause of Venetian 
decline. In fact, Venetian trade spiked for several decades after De Gama’s voyage in 
1498.63 The scarcity of Terraferma timber resources must be accounted for in a 
discussion of Venetian decline. 
In addition to Febvre, some of the first scholars who examined the role of the 
forests in the Venetian narrative were geographers. Ellen Semple articulated the role of 
the environment on the historical narrative in her 1911 book, Influences of Geographic 
Environment. She asserted that “all historical development takes place on the earth's 
surface, and therefore is more or less molded by its geographic setting.”64 Semple echoed 
the assertion of Immanuel Kant that "Geography lies at the basis of history."65 Semple’s 
German education, under Friedrich Ratzel, informed her discussion of Mediterranean 
forests.  
F. C. Lane produced the definitive Venetian forest history in 1934. His book, 
Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance is part of this larger trend of non-
Italian Venetian historians. Lane devoted an entire chapter in his book to the timber 
supplies of the Venetian Arsenale. Through his examinations of Marino Sanuto’s journals 
(Diarii), Lane concludes that oak, larch, and fir were the primary species used by the 
Venetian Arsenal.66 Oak served as the core of Venetian ships. According to Lane, the 
Venetian sources of oak were located near the Piave River, well within Venice’s 
mainland possessions. Lane stated that early Venice held access to plentiful supplies of 
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timber and exported timber resources from at least the tenth century.67 Lane, like Ellen 
Semple did for the classical world, argued that suitable specimens of oak rapidly depleted 
with Venetian use.68  Lane charted the development of Venetian forest law beyond the 
temporal parameters of this inquiry. This thesis serves as an expansion of Lane’s brief 
overview of Venetian forest law within the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and asserts 
that forest law is a neglected facet of Venice’s conquest of the mainland.  
J. Donald Hughes, J. V. Thirgood, and Russell Mieggs all focused on the 
Classical era, yet provided some insight into the timber supplies of Venice. Hughes 
argued that Greek and Roman shipbuilding resulted in the deforestation of sections of the 
Mediterranean. For the Romans, the loss of forests was “the most widespread and most 
noticeable change made in the natural environment.”69 The scarcity of classical sources 
makes it difficult to be as definitive as Hughes. It is uncertain, yet highly unlikely, that 
Roman timber harvests modified future Venetian state forests. The Romans harvested 
much of their ship-timber from Sicily.70 Mainland Italian stands of Arsenal-grade oak 
declined with continued Venetian use, however Hughes’s approach leaves little room for 
the eventual recovery of forests.  
Brian Pullan understated Venice’s access to mainland timber in his A History of 
Renaissance Venice. He argued that Venice and Genoa lacked the natural resources that 
were readily available for the Pisani. According to Pullan, Venice’s only natural 
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resources were “salt and fish.” This lack of resources forced the Venetians to 
“concentrate on maritime trade and expansion seawards.” 71 Venice could not have 
dominated the waters of the Adriatic without first dominating its hinterland. In order to 
maintain maritime might, ancient and Renaissance powers were forced to control a land-
based commodity (timber) through trade or political domination. This thesis asserts that 
Venice extended its control into Terraferma in part for its timber resources.  
In Venice: A Maritime Republic, F. C. Lane reiterated his arguments on the 
decline of Venetian oaks by stating, “The oaks grown in the Venetian Dominions did not 
suffice for the demands of the Arsenal and those of private shipbuilders.”72 Lane’s 
interpretation of the sources holds merit, but can be strengthened by addressing the policy 
measures the Venetian Republic implemented to stymie the oak shortage. Venetian forest 
conservation measures were partially the result of timber’s role in the defense of 
Venetian trade and Venice itself. 
John Perlin directly examined Venetian timber conservation policies in his survey 
of forest history. Perlin grants his reader a brief overview of Venetian timber 
conservation measures and discusses Venice’s relationship with mainland polities. Perlin 
correctly asserted that Venice pressured Verona into enacting several ship-timber 
conservation measures.73 Verona complied on paper, but like many other mainland 
polities, could not change local forest use in order to conserve the Arsenal’s prime oaks. 
This lack of Venetian institutional control was a contributing factor to the decline of 
prime timber stands.  
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Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan situated Venetian history within its natural setting of the 
lagoons. The domination of water resources makes up the bulk of her argument for 
Venice acting upon its natural surroundings.74 Security from natural and man-made 
dangers required Venice to control and dominate the waters of the lagoons, the Adriatic, 
and eventually the Eastern Mediterranean. Crouzet-Pavan cemented Venice’s intimate 
relationship with water to the city’s unique approach to naval warfare. She argued that 
prior Venetian histories have portrayed the Venetians as wary and timid in the face of 
opposition.75 The quadriga echoes the countless spoils won by Venice. These military 
victories, especially naval, were the foundation of the Venetian Empire. The Venetian 
fleet “was, and remained, its primary basis of its power.”76 Steady timber supplies were 
essential to maintaining Venice’s naval basis of power.  
Crouzet-Pavan briefly examined the timber supplies of the Venetian navy. She 
asserted that much of the oak supply came from Terraferma.77 As the oaks of the 
mainland became denuded with continual use in the fifteenth century, the Venetians 
incorporated several stands of oak from Istria. Like Lane, she asserted that the timber 
supplies of Terraferma became depleted, and thus the very “foundation of Venetian 
power was threatened.”78 Her assertions align themselves closely with the proposals for 
this thesis. However, she only briefly discussed Venice’s relationship to Terraferma 
through timber. Much more can be learned about Venice’s relationship with its mainland 
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polities through the Venetian need for timber. The Arsenal’s constant need for ship-
timber shaped the manner in which Venetian administrators perceived the forest 
resources of the Veneto. Crouzet-Pavan’s work is an excellent start in formulating a 
Venetian environmental narrative, but the importance of Terraferma timber needs to be 
addressed at further length. 
Karl Appuhn recently produced the first exclusively Venetian forest history in 
2009. Appuhn’s book, A Forest on the Sea: Environmental Expertise in Renaissance 
Venice, is an extension of his doctoral dissertation. Appuhn concluded that the Venetians 
established some of the first forest conservation laws. The Venetians established “a set of 
effective rational tools for enforcing the law and controlling the resource.”79 Venetian 
forestry was a remarkable development, Appuhn suggested, but did not succeed in 
conserving essential ship-timber specimens. New Venetian forest laws struggled to 
reshape centuries of forest use practice and perceptions. The forest conservation laws 
were ultimately unsuccessful because Venice could not regulate the small polities of 
Terraferma. Appuhn explored this notion through market regulations and cultural 
perceptions. Placing timber as one of the driving forces for Venetian expansion into 
Terraferma not only adds to Appuhn’s work but also provides insight into how and why 
Venice formulated these forest conservation laws.  
Appuhn’s book explored the development of Venice’s professional foresters 
(Provveditori sopra boschi). Venetian forestry evolved out of a “perceived” shortage of 
Arsenal-grade oak by Venetian legislators. 80 He argued that Venice’s mainland oak 
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supplies were not really declining, but a combination of mainland work shortages, the 
harvesting cycle, and local forest use practices produced the symptoms of a timber 
shortage to Venetian policymakers.81 Perceived shortage or real, the alarm felt by Venice 
opened a policy window for the implementation of forest conservation policies. Appuhn 
expertly examined the development of Venetian forest laws and reserves through his 
bureaucratic and political history. However, Arsenal timber was a war materiel and 
Venetians treated it as such. Thus, it is imperative that scholars attempt to understand 
how timber as a war resource shaped the Venetian perception of Terraferma’s 
environment. 
Venice’s treatment of the environment was decidedly different than its Northern 
European contemporaries. The shortage of oak inspired the Venetians to implement a 
scientific conservation program first and seek foreign supplies only under desperation. 
Yet, several prominent environmental historians claimed that Early Modern Europe’s 
scientific worldview supported a culture of environmental manipulation and dominance 
throughout the continent.82 As Appuhn suggested, Merchant and Crosby “assume that 
there was a monolithic European view of the relationship between humans and the 
natural world.”83 Renaissance perceptions of the environment were as diverse as the 
polities of the Holy Roman Empire. The Venetians and Genoese both relied on mainland 
timber and were maritime republics, yet reacted differently to similar environmental 
constraints. 
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This thesis provides an example of a culture that noticed deforestation and 
attempted to implement positive conservation policies. The end result was a system of 
forest policies that were far more advanced than any other natural resource policy system 
in sixteenth century Europe. The sudden rise of the Ottoman Navy in the fifteenth century 
suggests that decline of forests were not as widespread in the Mediterranean as Hughes 
asserted. Instead of seeing a widespread collapse of Mediterranean forests, it is best to see 
the denudation of Venetian timber as an environmental issue within its cultural and 
political context. In order to control the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean, the 
Venetians were forced to exploit the timber resources of the Po River Valley. The direct 
modification of timber distribution by the Venetians was focused on one specific region, 
rather than the entire Eastern Mediterranean.84  
An inquiry into the relationship between timber and Venetian law will grant a 
more complete understanding of how the Renaissance maritime republics managed their 
natural resources. Charting Venetian expansion into Terraferma, examining the origins of 
Venetian law, and parsing how Venice manipulated Roman legal traditions may seem 
trivial and purely academic, but environmental scholars and the general public can garner 
many valuable lessons from the Venetian narrative. A new Venetian timber history may 
provide an example of applicable history that not only informs the reader, but provides 
lessons on forest management and law. 
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CHAPTER II: BRIDLING SAN MARCO’S HORSES: EARLY TIMBER 
LEGISLATION AND THE EXPANSION INTO TERRAFERMA 
Milan, the Carraresi family of Padua, Hungaria, and the Genoese all challenged 
Venice’s role as the central power of Northeastern Italy. Venice’s commercial rivalry 
with Genoa dominated the narrative of the fourteenth century and illustrated a need for 
Venice to expand onto the mainland in order to supply the Arsenale with more secure 
supplies of timber. The Venetians experienced a series of defeats in the late fourteenth 
century, which inspired the city to strengthen its defenses through expansion and forest 
conservation policies. The pressures placed upon Venice by Padua and the Hungarians 
instigated a departure from Venice’s usual passive management of mainland cities. 
Active Venetian management of mainland polities preceded the direct domination of 
forest resources and began with the execution of the Carraresi family. 
The annexation of Terraferma extended from Venetian commercial ties to the 
mainland. Vital trade routes, agricultural products, and timber supplies linked Venice to 
the mainland since its foundation. The first historical record of Venice comes from the 
early sixth century. Cassiodorus, a Roman under the service of Theodoric, labeled the 
Venetians as harvesters of salt and fish-eaters.85 The salt and fish trade on the Italian 
mainland was the basis of the earliest Venetian commerce. The protection of Venice’s 
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early monopoly on the salt trade inspired one of the earliest Venetian military 
interventions on the mainland. In 822, and again in 933, the Venetians sacked their 
greatest competitor in the salt market, Commacchio. The seizure of Commacchio 
illustrated Venice’s willingness to implement military force to control natural resources 
from a very early era.  
Timber not only factored directly into the manufacture and transportation of early 
Venetian salt supplies, but the Republic also traded timber as a commodity alongside salt 
and fish.86 The expansion of Venice in the eleventh and twelfth centuries required the 
acquisition of timber supplies for the transportation of commercial goods and the physical 
foundation of the city. Oak pilings, known as tolpi in the Venetian sources, supported the 
foundation of the city. The most readily available supplies of tolpi were the mainland oak 
forests adjacent to Venice.87 The harvesting of tens of millions of tolpi strengthened 
Venice’s connection to the mainland.88 
The Venetians were still under the sphere of the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, even after the Pax Nicephori (Peace of Nicephorus) granted Venice 
political independence. Venice’s political and cultural ties to Constantinople were 
reflected in the Venetian admiration for Byzantine architecture and political systems. 
Byzantine law found its way into Venetian legal practices as well. The Venetian-
Byzantine connection can also be seen in Venice’s focus on maritime ventures in the east. 
The Venetian commercial connections to the Italian mainland were strong, yet Venice 
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specialized in monopolizing the trade of luxury goods out of the Aegean and Black Seas. 
Competition over the latter placed Venice in direct conflict with Genoa. 
At the instigation of Doge Enrico Dandolo, the Venetians and the Frankish 
crusaders permanently diminished the viability of the Byzantine Empire with the sacking 
of Constantinople in 1204. Venice and Genoa benefitted directly from the sudden power 
vacuum in the Aegean and Black Sea. Venice gained control over three-eighths of the 
Byzantine Empire.89 In the wake of the dismemberment of the Byzantine Empire, the 
Venetians acquired key shipping depots on the Dalmatian coast, Negroponte, and Crete. 
The Venetians also gained a large swath of Constantinople, centered on the city’s docks 
and shipbuilding infrastructure. Venice based its newly-found prominence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean upon maritime prowess, especially ship-building.90 However important a 
role eastern trade served for Venetian commerce, Venetian trade was still very much 
dependent upon mainland timber. The timber for Venice’s early thirteenth century 
expeditions likely came from nearby Mestre.91 
The decline of Byzantine power granted the Genoese unfettered access to the 
Black Sea trade routes. Crimean wheat supported the burgeoning population of Genoa, 
Venice, and their trading partners. The rivalry between Venice and Genoa over Black Sea 
trade caused several wars between the two republics. A deadly brawl between the 
Venetians and Genoese over the monastery of Saint Sabas in Acre ignited the War of 
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Saint Sabas in 1256.92 The Venetians displayed their unmatched talent for diplomacy by 
gaining the aid of the dominant maritime republic of the eleventh century, Pisa.  
The commercial rivalry between the Venetians and Genoese served as the 
background to Venice’s early involvement in the politics of the Italian mainland. The 
direct annexation of mainland polities was not the objective of Venice’s first intervention 
on the mainland, however; Venetian mainland policies sought to maintain favorable 
commercial ties with the markets of the Po Valley and the German markets beyond the 
Carnic Alps. The Venetians intervened against inland dukes or polities that hindered the 
passage of goods, including timber, out of and into Venice. An example of direct 
Venetian intervention on the mainland occurred in 1256 when the Venetians dispatched 
Marco Badoer to remove Ezzelino III de la Romano from power in Padua.93 Venice 
implemented indirect diplomatic connections to mold the political climate of the Po River 
Valley. 
Venice crippled rival polities on the mainland with the city’s diplomatic 
connections. The Veronese della Scalla family disrupted Venetian mainland commerce 
by imposing tolls on Venetian trade. Venice targeted Verona through an alliance with 
Florence in 1336. The Veronese placed themselves in an extremely strong position with 
the conquest of Padua and Treviso. However, the della Scalla family failed to defend 
their state from the combined forces of Venice, Florence, and the Milanese Visconti 
family. The Venetians, Florentines, and Milanese all benefitted from removing an 
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ascending state in the Po River Valley. The alliance allowed Venice to acquire Treviso in 
1339.  
The direct annexation of Treviso was Venice’s first permanent mainland 
acquisition and signified the first abandonment of the Republic’s passive management of 
the mainland. Venice primarily managed mainland states through diplomacy. Venice’s 
treatment of Padua in the 1230s serves as an example of typical Venetian mainland 
diplomacy. The Trevisans signed a capitulum, a legal statement incorporating Treviso 
into the Venetian Commune. The transfer of Venetian political institutions to Treviso 
formalized Venice’s first commitment to Terraferma. Venice installed a podestá, an 
appointed official with mayoral powers, to govern Treviso and established a large council 
akin to the Venetian Council of Ten.94 The Venetians allowed the Trevisans to keep their 
legal customs and provided the city with the freedom to elect lower officials. The 
motivations for the Venetian annexation of Treviso were primarily economic.95 
Dominating Treviso afforded Venice control over the exchange of goods on the Sile 
River and allowed the Venetians to control the timber resources of the Sile and Lower 
Piave.96  
The Venetians waged war against the Genoese over eastern trade in 1350. Control 
of Crimean commerce was still at the heart of conflict between the cities of St. Mark and 
St. George. The Crimean ports of Kaffa and Soldaia provided the rival maritime powers 
with marketable luxury goods such as Baktrian Silk, Far Eastern spices, and Russian furs. 
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Yet, neither republic was in the position for a prolonged engagement over the Black Sea 
in the 1350s. An epidemic of bubonic plague, which likely originated from the Crimean 
ports, struck Venice in 1348. The plague claimed sixty percent of the Venetian 
population by 1350 and left the Venetians reeling.97 
In 1350, the Genoese seized several Venetian vessels near Kaffa. The Venetians 
attacked Genoese trade in retaliation and the hostilities of the third Venetian-Genoese 
War commenced. Both sides attacked commercial ships and ports. The disruption of 
commerce was often a major aim for warfare between the two republics and for 
fourteenth century warfare in general.98 
Fighting over the strategic Galata Tower, the Genoese inflicted massive 
causalities on the combined Venetian/Aragonese fleet during an engagement in the 
Bosphorus in 1352. The Venetians lost well over 1600 men.99 The loss of so many able-
bodied mariners was catastrophic for the Venetians after the Black Death. The Genoese 
also lost a good portion of their fleet, but still held Galata Tower. After defeating the 
Venetians in the Bosphorus, the Genoese exacted trading rights from the Byzantine 
Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus that granted the Genoese a monopoly on the Black Sea 
trade. The Venetians partially relied on the Black Sea for wheat and could not allow the 
Genoese to possess unfettered control of the region.  
Wars with Genoa stifled Venetian commerce with the Italian mainland. Venice’s 
mainland markets stalled whilst the Arsenale placed pressure on the timber resources near 
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Treviso. Under normal circumstances, Venetian galleys lasted nearly a decade, yet the 
Venetians lost a good portion of their eastern fleet in the Bosphorus.100 Venice prioritized 
securing stands of timber on the mainland. To make matters worse, the Venetians 
experienced a timber shortage in the 1340s.101 The exportation of timber and usage by the 
Arsenale contributed to the shortage of Sessile Oak in that decade.102 The Arsenale’s 
acute need for timber required the Venetians to regulate the mainland’s timber market. 
The Venetians did not yet possess the authority to regulate mainland forests. Thus, in 
order to secure timber supplies for the Arsenale, the Venetians were required to control 
the importation of ship-timber into the city. 
Only the Great Council (Maggior Consiglio) possessed the authority to regulate 
incoming commerce into the city. This body of fifteen-hundred men formed the core of 
the legislative branch of the Venetian government and were the patricians of the city. All 
major policy decisions ultimately rested on the Great Council. The Senate (Pregadi) 
controlled day-to-day legislation and consisted of one hundred and twenty men with 
numerous ex officio members.103 The Doge oversaw the entire legislative body with his 
six councilors, the Minor Council (Minor Signoria). However, the councilors did not play 
a minor role because the Doge was essentially powerless without their approval. The 
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Great Council, the Senate, the Doge, and his councilors formed the basis of the Venetian 
government, known as the Commune Veneciarum in the primary sources. The Commune 
encapsulated the government’s authority to administer the Sestieri, the six cities of 
Venice. As the Venetians expanded onto the mainland the language of rule changed. 
 
Figure 2.1: Commune Veneciarum c. 1350.  
Another important Venetian political body that formulated forest policy was the 
Council of Ten. The Great Council established the Council of Ten in July of 1310 as an 
emergency measure against the Tiepolo family.104 Bajamonte Tiepolo attempted to 
overthrow the Great Council in June of 1310.105 The Great Council permanently 
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established the Council of Ten in 1334. The Council of Ten consisted of the ten 
councilors, the six ministers (Savii Grandi), and the Doge. In the fifteenth century, the 
Council of Ten administered the security of Terraferma and eventually enacted several 
important pieces of forest legislation. Timber was a crucial component for Venetian 
security and the Council of Ten’s authority to manage mainland forests was an extension 
of their primary responsibility to maintain the security of the Republic.  
The Great Council addressed the timber shortage of the 1340s through the passage 
of a law that regulated the oak trade within Venice. Enacted in 1350, the law granted the 
Arsenale its choice of the finest specimens of oak in the Venetian market.106 This 
measure was an indirect attempt on the part of the Great Council to control the quality of 
timber produced on the mainland. No legal precedence existed for Venice to dictate forest 
management policy to Treviso in 1350. The inconvenient timing of the oak shortage with 
the Genoese war inspired an epiphany among the Venetians. The timber resources of the 
mainland were finite and could very well disappear without regulation. This sudden 
realization spurred the Venetians into developing a policy of conservation and 
domination of mainland timber resources.107 Venetian forest laws of the fourteenth 
century serve as the most tangible object of Venice’s policy of forest conservation.   
Venice, Milan, and Florence dominated the politics of late fourteenth century 
Northeastern Italy. Venice’s role as a major player came from its commercial ties to the 
Italian mainland and the city’s vast trading empire in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. 
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Situated in the upper watershed of the Po River, Milan sought to expand south under the 
leadership of Gian Galeazzo II Visconti. The Visconti family dominated Milan since the 
early fourteenth century and constituted a more traditional lordship (Signoria) than 
Venice.108 Milanese expansion in the south placed them in direct conflict with the 
Florentines, who sought to protect their interests in Romagna. Although the Florentines 
distrusted the Venetians, they found a common enemy in Milan. 
During the second Venetian-Genoese war, Genoa came under the protection of 
the Milanese Visconti family. Milan’s proximity to Treviso placed Venice’s only direct 
mainland possession in a precarious position during this war. Nevertheless, the Milanese 
threat and the timber shortage exposed two vital weaknesses in Venice’s position on the 
mainland. One source of timber was not only insufficient for the production of warships 
in the Arsenale, but was dangerous as well. The Venetians flirted with disaster by relying 
on one vulnerable city for their timber supply. Likewise, the Milanese also revealed to 
Venice and its rivals that the Republic lacked a buffer between its lagoons and rival 
mainland powers like Milan and Florence. 
The Genoese recommenced hostilities with the Venetians in 1354. Paganino 
Doria attacked Venetian cities along the Dalmatian coast and disrupted Venetian trade 
throughout the Adriatic. Paganino was part of the long line of the Dorias that produced 
learned and skilled commanders throughout the history of the republic of St. George. 
After his success in the Adriatic, Doria shifted his focus to the Aegean Sea. The 
Venetians pursued Doria with fifty-six ships, however Doria ambushed the Venetians and 
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captured them near the harbor of Sapienza in November of 1354. The Genoese caught the 
Venetians resupplying and attacked them while their vessels were beached.109  
The Venetian defeat at Sapienza placed a heavy burden upon Venetian commerce 
and the Arsenale’s timber supplies. The defeat also illustrated that continued war with 
Genoa required the Republic to maintain multiple secure sources of timber. Dalmatia and 
the Italian mainland were the most likely sources during the second Venetian-Genoese 
war. The Arsenale required properly seasoned timber reserves in order to replace the lost 
vessels. The Venetians knew the dangers of ships built of green timber. 110 As Vegetius, 
the fourth century Roman strategist, noted, “nothing is more dangerous for sailors than 
fresh timber.”111 Green timber was prone to cracking in saltwater and made ships slower. 
The timber shortage on the mainland left the Venetians and the Arsenale in no place to 
continue hostilities with the Genoese in the winter of 1354-55. In June 1355, the 
Venetians brokered a truce with the Milanese through an agreement that barred the 
Venetians and Genoese from trade in the Black Sea for three years.112 
In 1356, Hungaria and the Genoese both attacked the Venetians. Venice’s direct 
domination of Trevisan politics allowed the Venetian podestá to foil a plot to hand over 
the city to the Hungarians. Treviso bogged King Lajos’s forces down and allowed the 
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Venetians to negotiate a truce in the late months of 1356.113 However, Treviso crumbled 
in 1357 and the Hungarians controlled the mainland shores of the lagoon. The Venetians 
dispatched envoys to the Magyar king to sue for peace. Venetian possessions on the 
Dalmatian coast served as the pretext for the Hungarian War and King Lajos sought to 
ruin any opportunity for Venice to recover its position in Dalmatia. Thus, he demanded 
Venice’s Dalmatian possessions as the cost for peace.  
Losing the Dalmatian cities would impede Venice’s access to a ship-timber 
conifer that the forests around Treviso lacked. Trade upon the Adriatic united the Latin 
Venetians and Slavic Dalmatians more than it separated them.114 Zara (Zadar), Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik), and Fiume (Rijeka) provided the Venetian fleet with crucial stops along the 
way to the Aegean and granted Venice trade in precious metals, slaves, and timber. 
Norwich suggests that Dalmatian Pine was the “chief source of timber for Venice’s 
fleet.”115 Such an assertion is problematic because Sessile Oak was the primary species 
that the Arsenale and private shipwrights consumed. The construction of ships primarily 
with species of the Pinus genus was more prevalent in the Ancient Era.116 The Arsenale 
acquired Silver Fir from Dalmatian cities for the production of masts and spars.  
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East European Review 32, no. 78 (December 1953): 11. 
115 Norwich, A History of Venice, 233. 
116 The dominance of Oak in the Renaissance is in stark contrast to the widespread use of conifers for 
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Figure 2.2: Dalmatia. Source: C. I. Gable, Dalmatia Pirates 
(http://www.boglewood.com/timeline/pirates.html). 
The Hungarian war only magnified Venice’s concern about the security of 
Treviso. The Venetians acquiesced to the peace terms with the Hungarian King because 
very few alternatives existed for the struggling Republic. The Hungarians firmly 
controlled Treviso, the “final bastion, on which the safety of the Republic itself 
depended.”117 The Venetians sacrificed their Dalmatian provinces for the safety of 
Treviso. Repeated assaults upon the Venetian mainland required Venice to shift some of 
its focus onto securing Treviso and its valuable timber market. Although the Venetians 
lost their Dalmatian possessions, the Hungarians afforded them access to Istrian timber. 
Venetian presence in Istria dates back well into the ninth century and did not hinder King 
Lajos’s aspirations in Dalmatia.118 Yet, access to Istrian Fir was always problematic due 
to a general lack of labor and the peninsula’s precariously close position to Dalmatia.119 
A revolt in Trieste in 1369 hindered Venetian access to Istrian timber by halting timber 
                                                 
117 Norwich, A History of Venice, 233. 
118 On the Venetians in Istria see Suzanne Mariko Miller, “Venice in the East Adriatic: Experiences and 
Experiments in Colonia Rule in Dalmatia and Istria c. 1150–1348” (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 
1997). 
119 On a lack of Istrian labor, see Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 40. 
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harvests. The loss of Dalmatia made it crucial for Venice to strengthen its commercial 
and political ties to the mainland in order to bolster the security of the lagoon and 
safeguard valuable mainland commerce, including timber. 
The Carraresi family is one of the lesser-known Italian families of the fourteenth 
century, yet they played a direct role in instigating Venetian expansion onto the Italian 
mainland. The family seized control of Padua from the della Scalla family in the early 
fourteenth century.120 The family looked to capitalize on Venice’s weakened position 
after the Hungarian war and agitated anti-Venetian sentiments in Padua. Francesco da 
Carrara raised an army and besieged the city in the autumn of 1369. The Venetians 
successfully defended the mainland from the Carraresi family until the Hungarians 
intervened once again in 1373. The combined forces of the Carraresi and the Hungarians 
handed the Venetians two swift defeats. The war turned in Venice’s favor when the 
Venetians captured the nephew of the King Lajos near a Venetian fortification on the 
Brenta River. Venice forced the Hungarians out of the war and isolated Francesco from 
his allies.  
The Carraresi attacked Venetian fortifications on the Brenta River in order to 
acquire the nearby saltworks, yet the Brenta played a crucial role in Venetian mainland 
commerce. The economy of the mainland and the Venetian timber suppliers utilized the 
region’s major rivers for the transportation of goods. Treviso’s economic importance and 
proximity to the Sile River was no mere coincidence. Each mainland timber river 
presented the Venetians with unique challenges, but the Piave watershed supported the 
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growth of the four essential ship-timber species: Sessile Oak (Quercus sessiliflora), 
European Beech (Fagus sylvatica), Silver Fir (Abies alba), and European Larch (Larix 
decidua). The Venetians also harvested Wych Elm (Ulmus glabra) and Persian Walnut 
(Juglans regia) for the construction of mastheads and rudders, respectively.121 However, 
both species played a secondary role in ship production.  
 
Figure 2.3: Sessile Oak. Source: Hesse, Germany - Wikimedia Commons 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Quercus_petraea_06.jpg). 
 
Figure 2.4: European Beech. Source: Wikimedia Commons 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/Grib_skov.jpg).  
                                                 
121 Lane, Venetian Ships, 218. The Romans likely introduced the Persian Walnut into the Po River Valley 
from Greece in the 2nd century B.C.E. Hemp was also a crucial component for riggings. 
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Figure 2.5: Silver Fir. Source: Thüringer Wald, Germany-Wikimedia Commons 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8e/Abies_alba_Schleus_Berg_b_Suh
l_ThW_Th_Dreger.jpg). 
 
Figure 2.6: Wych Elm. Source: California State Polytechnical University-SLO 
SelecTree (http://selectree.calpoly.edu/photos.lasso?rid=800). 
 
Figure 2.7: European Larch. Source: U.C. Berkeley. CalPhotos 
(http://calphotos.berkeley.edu/imgs/512x768/0000_0000/0613/2030.jpeg).  
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Figure 2.8: Persian Walnut. Source: Persian Walnut. Oregon State University. 
Department of Horticulture (http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ldplants/images/jure6888.jpg). 
The Venetians consistently experienced shortages of the two deciduous hardwood 
species: oak and beech. Sessile Oak, also referred to as Durmast Oak, was the most 
important tree species for the Venetian Arsenale. Oak provided Venetian vessels with a 
solid, rot-resistant keel and “accounted for over three-quarters of the timber in a Venetian 
ship.”122 The Arsenale also utilized Oak’s decurrent and branching growth pattern by 
fashioning odd angled branches into knees for deck beams and solid ribs. Sessile Oaks 
prefer the large swath of alluvial soil near the Venetian Lagoon and the lowlands of the 
Po River Valley. The Arsenale harvested beech at intermediate altitudes for the 
construction of oars. Beech’s affinity for well-drained soils allowed the species to thrive 
only in a limited section of the mainland.123 Prominent beech stands appear in the lower 
montane zone at 1,300 feet. Venetian industries placed pressure on the Arsenale by 
consuming the limited beech forests on the mainland for the production of charcoal.  
In the 1320s Marino Sanuto the elder remarked to Pope John XXII that the best fir 
and larch in the world could be found in Venice.124 Fir and larch are softwood species 
                                                 
122 Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, 54. 
123 The range of Terraferma beech is similar to the distribution of the Carta Ecopedologica’s Soil Region 
3.40–49. “Po River Valley” European Soil Data Centre (ESDAC), Accessed January 23, 2014. 
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that prefer higher elevations than both oak and beech. Silver Fir thrives in the cool, moist 
air of Dolomites and avoids the relative warmth of the Po River valley. Thus, the 
Venetians ventured into the Dolomites to acquire appropriate fir specimens. A mature 
tree served as the best material for masts. A Venetian shipwright could hone several 
masts out of a 180-foot tall mature Silver Fir. The Arsenale constructed interior molding 
and beams from larch.125 Like fir, larch also thrives in cold conditions and required well-
drained montane soils. Although larch played a secondary role to fir and oak, secure 
access to the species required the Venetians to extend their control into the tree’s habitat.  
Tree species distribution, available labor, and proximity to rivers helped to 
determine the location of Venetian timber harvests. Each ship-timber species favored 
specific climactic and soil conditions.126 Conifers’ proclivity for cold and moist environs 
forced the Venetians to look for fir at higher elevations in the Alps, whereas oak thrived 
in the alluvial lowlands of the Po River Valley. Available manpower was a real concern 
for Arsenale tree harvests.127 Harvests often occurred in February or March to coincide 
with higher water flows in rivers and the labor market.  Available labor for timber harvest 
was contingent upon the mainland agricultural cycle and labor was often available after 
the planting of the winter wheat crop. Population density also influenced the amount of 
available labor. Luckily for the Arsenale, oak stands thrived along the densely populated 
Po River. However, mountain settlements with access to conifers possessed smaller pools 
                                                 
125 Venetian source for species of timber: Senato Mar, reg, 21, ff. 20, 32. Larch is a bit of an oddity in the 
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of labor. Manpower dissipated as harvests moved further north into the Alps or moved 
east of the Piave River. Territories farther east, such as Istria, consistently lacked 
available labor for harvests. 
Deep rivers with consistent spring flow rates allowed the Venetians to transport 
timber out of the Po River Valley and the Alps for final production at the Arsenale. The 
Venetians planned their harvests to focus on the timber nearest to rivers in order to ease 
transportation and reduce cost. Fine timber reserves existed along the Quieto in Istria, yet 
the Quieto possessed inconsistent flow rates, which made Istrian timber expensive.128 
Timing the harvest with the snow melt played a crucial role in a successful timber harvest 
for the Arsenal. Years with low precipitation posed serious limitations on the 
transportation of timber to Venice. The vicissitudes of conditions imposed by the labor 
force and the weather made it impractical for Venice to base its entire timber supply on 
just Treviso and the Sile River. Control of Terraferma’s rivers would allow the Venetians 
to manipulate the exchange of timber on the mainland. 
Out of the six important timber watersheds, the Piave produced Venice’s richest 
supply of harvestable timber and all the species necessary for ship production. The Piave 
is an important river for this inquiry because the Venetians established their first Arsenale 
reserves along the Piave at Belluno and Montello. The Piave originates in the Carnic Alps 
near the foot of Mount Peralba at an altitude of 8,500 feet. The forests of the Upper Piave 
fall within the upper montane Mediterranean zone and are dominated by conifers with 
intermittent beech stands.129 Cadore and Belluno provided Venice with timber supplies 
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out of the Upper Piave. The conifer dominated forests of Cadore and Belluno give way to 
a mixture of conifers and deciduous trees near Asolo. This middle stretch provided the 
Venetians primarily with beech, but also supported stands of oak. The Lower Piave 
nourished excellent stands of oaks and settlements near the river possessed abundant 
amounts of manpower.130 The Piave emptied near the Venetian lagoon and was ideal for 
it provided a deep flowrate for the transportation of lumber. 
The Isonzo and Tagliamento allowed the Venetians to harvest timber from Friuli. 
Both rivers originate in the Alps and harbored good stands of oak and beech. The 
decrease in population density along the Isonzo made it difficult for successful harvests. 
Harvesting along the Tagliamento was also not ideal because of the river’s unpredictable 
flowrate.131 The Venetians floated timber from the Isonzo’s mouth some eighty miles 
away from Venice to the Arsenale. Despite the limitations of the Tagliamento and the 
Isonzo, the Venetians extracted timber from Venzone and Gorizia. 
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Figure 2.9: Timber Rivers within the Po River Watershed. Adapted from the 
Eastern Kentucky University Department of Geography 
(http://people.eku.edu/davisb/geo100/Poriver.htm).  
The location of rivers and the distribution of ship-timber species also affected 
Venetian rivals. Venice’s proximity to the steady gradation of the vegetative zones of the 
Po Plain and the Alps afforded the Venetians more timber species to work with than their 
rivals. Liguria offered beech and abundant supplies of chestnut to the Genoese. Yet, 
Genoese supplies of ship-timber were spread along thin Ligurian coastal shelves. The Po 
River watershed granted the Venetians several avenues for timber transportation that 
Liguria lacked. It is undeniable that the unique geography of Venice upon the lagoon 
afforded St. Mark’s Republic certain advantages that its rivals lacked.   
The ongoing Venetian-Genoese rivalry rendered Venice’s foothold on Treviso 
and the timber trade of the Piave untenable. A fight over precedence during the 
coronation of Peter II of Cyprus instigated yet another war with Genoa in 1378.132 The 
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fight over precedence was simply a proxy for tensions over eastern trade. The fight 
started the War of Chioggia. This new war was much different from previous conflicts 
between Genoa and Venice. The Genoese used the war to attack Venice’s exposed 
mainland territory and the war served as a springboard for Venice’s conquest of 
Terraferma and the mainland’s timber resources.  
The Venetians also struggled to find steady supplies of beech during the latter half 
of the fourteenth century. The 1350 regulation on oak trade within Venice responded to a 
shortage of prime oak. The Venetians referred to the oak shortage as a carestia, a famine. 
Such language in the primary sources is often paired only with a shortage of wheat or 
salt.133 Wheat and salt were the other two natural resources that Venice managed through 
the manipulation of legal codes. The Great Council passed a regulation in 1372 that 
imposed a nine grossi fine upon ship captains per lost oar.134 The grosso was a measure 
of silver Venetian coinage equivalent to 4% of the value of a ducat.135  Commanders 
often lost several dozen oars at a time. The fine could increase quite quickly, so many 
ship captains avoided the fine by leaving excess oars with the Arsenale. The oar policy 
attempted to conserve beech supplies with Venice and did not directly address timber 
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consumption on the mainland. Only an extension of Venetian political authority onto the 
mainland would allow Venice to govern and direct forest resources. 
A Venetian ship could not operate without beech oars. The construction of each 
large Venetian galley required 180 oars and consumed, at a conservative estimate, forty 
mature beech trees.136 Thus a small fleet of fourteen galleys required over 2,500 oars and 
consumed 560 trees. Such a figure does not consider the additional pressure placed upon 
timber resources by Venetian firewood and industrial needs. The scarcity of beech made 
oars a valuable commodity for the Arsenale and the general shortage of timber, coupled 
with demographic losses to the plague, reduced the size of fleets in the War of Chioggia.  
In preparation for another naval fight with Genoa, the Great Council placed Vittor 
Pisani and Carlo Zeno in control of the Republic’s naval forces. In May of 1378, Zeno 
began a raiding campaign on Genoese vessels in the Aegean and Pisani led a Venetian 
fleet of fourteen galleys to attack the Genoese in the Tyrrhenian Sea.137 Pisani’s 
expedition found early success with his defeat of a Genoese fleet south of the mouth of 
the Tiber. The Venetians turned their attention to reacquiring cities along the Dalmatian 
coast. Pisani captured Cattaro (Kotor) and Sebenico (Šibenik) before retiring at Pola for 
the winter of 1378-79. The bitterly cold and damp conditions of the quarters at Pola 
weakened the Venetian fleet. The Genoese caught the Venetians in port in May 1379 and 
captured most of Pisani’s ships. The Venetians killed the Genoese commander, Luciano 
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Doria, but lost complete control of the Adriatic Sea and imprisoned Pisani for neglecting 
to patrol Pola’s harbor.138  
Venice emerged from the defeat at Pola in a defenseless position. The Genoese 
secured alliances with the Carraresi and the Hungarians. The Genoese navy cruised 
through the Adriatic with impunity and the Carraresi shut Venice off from its mainland. 
The Genoese, Carraresi, and Hungarians planned to choke Venice into submission. 
Venice’s policy of noninterference in the politics of the mainland allowed Genoa to 
quickly blockade the city. Genoa took the island of Chioggia in August and prepared to 
assault the city directly. Venice sued for peace, but Pietro Doria, the Genoese 
commander, replied, “You will never have peace from the lord of Genoa until we bridle 
the unreined horses of Saint Mark.”139 The death of Pietro Doria’s nephew at Pola 
doubtlessly still vexed him and the Genoese acted in a manner that suggests that they 
intended to indefinitely ruin Venice’s naval and commercial capabilities.140 
The seizure of Chioggia prompted the Venetians to release Pisani from jail. The 
Venetian populace believed that the Senate erred by not allowing Pisani’s fleet to winter 
in Venice, instead of Pola.141 Pisani avoided direct conflict and raided Genoese supply 
lines in the lagoon while the city anxiously awaited the return of Carlo Zeno from the 
east. Zeno wreaked havoc upon Genoese shipping by seizing merchant vessels off the 
coast of the Levant. However, he returned to grant his home city aid in January 1380. 
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Zeno quickly surrounded the Genoese forces in Chioggia. The Venetian counterattack on 
Chioggia is noteworthy in naval history as the first known use of gunpowder to bombard 
a city from ships.142 Venetian bombards killed the ever confident Pietro Doria.143 
The Venetians turned the tables on the Genoese and starved them into peace 
negotiations in June of 1380. Padua and the Hungarians faded from Genoa’s side and 
Venice secured its adjacent mainland. However, the Venetians “avoided defeat” rather 
than secured victory at Chioggia.144 Venice narrowly escaped a Genoese occupation and 
did not possess the manpower nor a sufficient supply of seasoned timber to continue a 
naval offensive. The war concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Turin in 1381. The 
provisions of the treaty were unfavorable to Venice. The Venetians granted Trieste its 
freedom under the condition of a yearly tribute and ceded the economically important and 
strategic island of Tenedos to Genoa.145 The war itself left Venice without allies and in 
order to broker an alliance with Austria, the Venetians gifted Treviso to Leopold III. The 
Venetians lost direct control of the resources of the mainland, including timber.  
Wars with Milan, Hungaria, Genoa, and the Carraresi family resulted in a series 
of defeats that made Venice reevaluate the security of Treviso and its mainland timber 
supply. These defeats only strengthened the Venetian resolve. After the Genoese 
occupation of Chioggia, the Venetian citizens declared, “Let us arm ourselves; let use 
equip and mount what galleys we have in the Arsenale. Let us go forth; it is better to 
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perish in the defence of our country than to perish here through want.”146 The most direct 
repercussion of wars with Genoa, Milan, and Hungaria was Venice’s abandonment of a 
passive system of management of the mainland. The establishment of new ministers and 
the direct confrontation with the Carraresi illustrated Venice’s newfound commitment to 
the mainland. 
The War of Chioggia not only eliminated the Venetians from the timber trade of 
Northeastern Italy, but also reshaped the Venetian government. The Venetians formed the 
Collegio in 1380 in an attempt to truncate the formulation of war policy. The Collegio 
consisted of six ministers (Savii Grandi) of war, finance, and maritime possessions.147 
The ministers expedited policy-making on matters of small consequence, but deferred to 
the Great Council on more important policy issues.148 The establishment of the Collegio 
was a form of Venetian reactive policy. Venetian timber policy in the fourteenth century 
was also reactive because the timber legislation of 1350 and 1372 attempted to remedy an 
existing problem. 
The Peace of Turin largely ignored the wishes of the Carraresi family. Francesco 
de Carrara sought to extend Padua’s influence over Treviso. Carrara besieged Treviso in 
1382 and the Austrians, rather than fund an expensive defense of the city, sold the city to 
Padua.149 The purchase of Treviso granted the Carraresi control over the most lucrative 
                                                 
146 Hazlitt, History of the Venetian Republic, 279. 
147 Donato Giannotti, La Republica Fiorentina e la Veneziania (Venice: Company'tipi del gondoliere, 
1840), 354. Google Books, Digitized Online, Accessed October 1, 2013, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=67BBAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&
cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
148 On the Collegio settling small policy matters: Anoynomous, Description ou traictié du gouvernement ou 
régime de la cite et signeurie de Venise (Perret 1896, II), 272. In Chambers, Fletcher, and Pullan, eds., 
Venice: A Documentary History, 43–45. 
149  Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, 244. 
63 
 
trade route on the mainland. The Carraresi also acquired important timber-producing 
settlements like Belluno and Feltre. In one move, Padua purchased the entire Venetian 
mainland for 100,000 ducats.150 The Carraresi purchase of Treviso and Cadore irritated 
the Venetians.151 The family consistently challenged Venetian presence on the mainland 
and disrupted the flow of goods from the mainland into the city. Reacquiring control of 
mainland timber markets required the elimination of Padua’s ascending power and, if 
need be, the Carraresi family. 
The Venetians lacked the financial means to prevent the seizure of Treviso and 
allowed the city to fall under the influence of Padua. The Carraresi looked to expand their 
influence west in 1378 with an alliance with Gian Galeazzo of the Milanese Visconti.152 
Both families attacked Verona and Vicenza under an agreement to split the territories 
after the campaign. Milan, however, reneged on the agreement and occupied both cities. 
The Venetians likely realized that Milan was also anxious about a strong mainland power 
centered at Padua.153 Venice reluctantly accepted Milanese proposals for an alliance 
against Padua. Venetian Galleons attacked Padua by sailing up the Brenta and, with the 
aid of the Milanese, deposed Francesco in 1388. His son, Francesco Novello, succeeded 
him as signori of Padua.154 
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Novello completed Venice’s task for them by retaking Padua from the Milanese 
in 1390. The Venetians admitted Novello into the Venetian nobility and provided him 
with full citizenship.155 Venice rarely granted mainland families admission into the 
Venetian nobility and Novello was an exception. The Republic clearly viewed the 
Novello-led Carraresi family as an ally in the 1390s.156 Novello did not hinder the timber 
trade near Padua and Treviso and was more concerned with confronting Milanese 
expansion. The Venetians used Padua and the Carraresi as a buffer between themselves 
and Milan.  
Venice ultimately regained Treviso in a peace settlement between Milan, Padua, 
and Florence in 1392. Keen Venetian diplomacy allowed the Republic to regain the 
important timber city of Treviso without engaging in a costly war. After regaining 
Treviso, the Venetian Republic demonstrated a ruthless, but systematic, calculus in their 
treatment of the Carraresi. The death of Gian Galeazzo in 1402 weakened Milan and 
diminished Venice’s obligation to maintain its relationship with Padua and Francesco 
Novello. The Carraresi still wished to amend the conditions of the Peace of Turin and 
Novello attempted to expand westward. Novello only needed to give the Venetians the 
slightest excuse for the Republic to move against him. The disfigurement of a Venetian 
envoy by Novello prompted the Venetians to turn on the Carraresi family. The Republic 
invested in a campaign of “diplomacy, bribery, terror, and war” to eliminate the 
Carrresi.157 After much political maneuvering, the Venetians attacked and quickly sacked 
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Padua in 1404. Venice captured and imprisoned Novello and his sons during the siege of 
Padua.  
The capture of the Carraresi family provided the Venetians with several options. 
They could cloister Novello and his sons, but his influence in Padua made such a choice 
problematic. The Carraresi consistently interfered with Venetian commerce and the 
security of the mainland. The offenses of the Carraresi line fell upon Novello and his 
sons. The elimination of the family allowed the Venetians to solidify the security of 
Treviso and the mainland timber trade. Thus, the Venetians terminated the Carraresi line 
by strangling Novello and his sons with a crossbow string in January of 1406.158 The 
execution of an entire family was an entirely new tactic of Venetian diplomacy and 
signified Venetian commitment to the mainland and its timber resources. 
The wars with Padua, Hungaria, and Genoa required Venetian involvement in the 
politics on the mainland, yet the destruction of the Carraresi line was a stark departure 
from traditional Venetian diplomacy and served as a turning point for Venetian relations 
with the mainland. As noted, Venice usually settled political conflicts on the mainland by 
peaceful means.159 With the execution of Novello, Venice illustrated its commitment to 
the security of Treviso and the city’s commercial connections. The Venetian treatment of 
the memory of the Carraresi was also unprecedented. The Council of Ten declared 
damnatio memoriae, “a condemnation of memory,” on the Carrara name in Padua. The 
Venetians removed family memorials and replaced them with St. Mark’s Lion. Dead men 
                                                 
158 Krestchmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, II, 255 & 600. cf. Gatari, The Fortunes of Francesco da Carrara, 
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159 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State, 8. 
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not only wage no wars, but also do not interrupt commerce.160 The beginning of Venice’s 
conquest of Terraferma rests with the execution of the Carraresi. 
Venetian expansion into Terraferma in the beginning of the fifteenth century 
followed a concerted plan with two objectives. The first objective was bolstering the 
security of the lagoon. An expanded Terraferma provided Venice with added security 
against mainland powers. The second objective was the expansion of commerce on the 
mainland. Fortresses on the region’s major rivers not only provided protection to 
Terraferma, but also monitored Venetian commerce. Controlling the mainland granted 
the Venetian patriciate more opportunities for economic expansion. Venetian patrician 
families invested in the mainland since the eleventh century and the conquest of 
Terraferma granted these families more connections to the mainland through government 
posts and marriages.161  
In the beginning of the fifteenth century, timber and foodstuffs were the most 
important commercial products of the mainland.162 The addition of Padua, Verona, and 
Vicenza in 1404 through 1406 granted the Venetians direct access to the timber trades of 
the Adige and Brenta. The Venetian administration of Padua was in stark contrast to 
other Terraferma polities. When the Venetians first annexed Treviso in 1339, Venice 
allowed the city to keep most of its political customs and laws. Venice dismantled 
Padua’s political system and imposed Venetian law upon the city. Venetian timber 
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legislation followed a similar pattern of first granting concessions and later, in the 
fifteenth century, obtaining direct control of the mainland’s timber resources.  
The Venetians also managed their mainland armies in a different manner after the 
conquest of Padua, Vicenza, and Verona. Instead of disbanding mercenary troops in the 
winter, Venice maintained troops in Vicenza for several years after 1406. A brief war 
with Hungaria in the 1410s demonstrated Venice’s shift to a permanent standing force in 
Terraferma.163 The Terraferma army was composed of mercenaries who proved their 
reliability, at least to the Venetian Senate, with the seizure of Rovereto in 1416. Rovereto 
not only possessed excellent stands of beech for use in the Arsenale, but also allowed the 
Venetians to control the commerce of the middle portion of the Adige. The Venetian 
employment of mercenaries differed from other Italian cities. Venice established a “cadre 
of permanent condottieri,” unlike the temporary mercenary commanders employed by 
Milan and Florence.164  
Conflict with Milan in the 1420s also resulted in the acquisition of prime 
timberland for the Venetian Arsenale. Milanese expansion into Romagna forced Florence 
to seek an alliance with Venice in 1423. The three cities dominated Northern Italy, yet 
the rapid expansion of the Visconti dominions under the late Gian Galeazzo illustrated 
Milan’s potential to dominate Northern Italy. An alliance with Florence would allow the 
Venetians to stymie Milan’s power on the Western border of the new acquisition on the 
mainland. Yet, not all Venetians favored the recent expansion into Terraferma. Tommaso 
Mocenigo, the ailing ex-doge, cautioned against further expansion on the mainland. He 
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acknowledged the commercial prosperity of the mainland, but warned the Venetians 
against turning their back upon the sea.165 The newly elected doge, Francesco Foscari, 
concluded that Milan represented a real threat to Terraferma and the Venetians allied 
with the Florentines. The alliance with Florence allowed the Venetians to check Milanese 
power and acquire Bergamo and Brescia in 1428. Bergamo and Brescia were well within 
Milan’s sphere of influence and served as the western terminus of Venetian Terraferma.  
The annexation of Bergamo and Brescia concluded a coordinated effort by the 
Venetians to secure their mainland frontier and its commercial products. Although 
Terraferma evolved out of Venetian commercial connections to the mainland, the War of 
Chioggia served as the springboard for Venetian expansion. Wars with Genoa, Padua, 
and Hungaria in the late fourteenth century illustrated the fragility of the city’s 
commercial ties to the mainland and also revealed Treviso’s vulnerability to foreign 
interference. Setbacks against these rival powers induced Venice to develop a foreign 
policy that coupled frontier security with resource conservation.  
Firewood and timber shortages also placed pressure on the Venetian government. 
Combined with constant foreign conflict, these timber shortages opened a policy window 
for forest regulation in the 1350s and 1370s. The forest laws of 1350 and 1372 were 
limited to market regulations because the Venetians lacked the legal precedence to 
control mainland timber resources. The ultimate conquest of Terraferma, between the 
executions of the Carraresi in 1406 and the annexation of Bergamo in 1428, granted 
Venice control of all of the six important timber rivers. In a matter of thirty years, the 
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Arsenale’s access to forest resources expanded from a near-permanent closure of the 
market to a selection of the best timber of the Po River watershed. However, an 
incorporation of a mainland polity into Venetian Terraferma did not entitle Venice to 
direct control of the polity’s timber resources. Many Terraferma cities willingly 
incorporated themselves into the Venetian Republic in exchange for protection from 
other mainland powers.166  The conquest of Terraferma served only as the foundation for 
direct Venetian control of the timber resources of the mainland. The key to Venice’s 
dominance of Terraferma forests rested with the development of Venetian forest law in 
the fifteenth century. 
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CHAPTER III: THE LEGAL CONQUEST OF TERRAFERMA’S TIMBER 
RESOURCES 
In 1569, a Florentine visitor to the city of St. Mark gibed that Venetian laws “are 
often altered and fundamentally changed-- hence the truth of the saying, Parte venetiana 
dura una settimana. Seven days suffice before time obscures a Venetian law.”167 The 
anonymous Florentine placed little faith in the Venetian legal system and was quite 
possibly vexed at Venice’s success in comparison to the dismantled Florentine Republic. 
The Florentine’s comments on Venetian law in the middle of the sixteenth century serves 
as a nice lens into the development of Venetian forest law during the fifteenth century. 
The Florentine questioned the efficacy of the Venetian legal system, yet Venetian forest 
law developed into an efficient system of state-owned forest reserves. By the end of the 
fifteenth century, Venice’s forest laws dominated the timber of communal forests in 
Terraferma and ultimately illustrated the fallacies of the Florentine’s critique. 
Early Venetian forest legislation addressed timber market conditions within 
Venice. The 1350 and 1372 laws focused on oak and beech; the two most important and 
most scarce timber species for Arsenale ship production. In the fourteenth century, the 
Great Council and the Council of Ten only possessed the authority to regulate timber 
market conditions within the sestieri. These market controls laid the legal foundation for 
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more substantial Venetian forest policy in the fifteenth century. Venetian forest policy 
evolved from these market edicts into the 1476 Forest Laws, which controlled local 
communities’ access to timber stands. However, Venice’s role as protector of the 
mainland required Venice to first modify the language of its dominion over Terraferma 
before claiming legal dominion over the mainland’s forests. Likewise, acquiring legal 
rights to mainland timber resources required the Venetians to insert themselves into 
Terraferma legal traditions.  
The Venetians’ first attempt to control Terraferma timber occurred in June 1410. 
The Doge, Michele Steno, reminded the Venetian podestá of Belluno to promote the flow 
of timber out of the Upper Piave and into the Arsenale.168 Steno’s remarks to the podestá 
questioned who legally owned the forests around Belluno. Many of the Terraferma 
polities, including Belluno, possessed very little legal precedence to dictate who or what 
entity could control their forest resources. Steno’s request signified Venice’s initial 
attempt to fill the legal vacuum on forest ownership left by local Roman-based civil 
codes, statuti. The Bellunese podestá’s compliance on the matter did not indicate that 
Venice possessed sole ownership of Belluno’s forests. Rather, the letter revealed that the 
Venetian government possessed a concerted interest in the forests around Belluno and 
wished to secure usufructory rights for their timber merchants. 
In the early fifteenth century, the relationship between Venice and its mainland 
possessions was not clearly defined. In the 1420s the Venetians began to cement their 
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superior position over Terraferma polities. As Michael Knapton claimed, the “language 
of dominion” in Terraferma changed in the early 1420s.169 Venice no longer referred to 
itself as a commune.170 The use of commune in Renaissance law and correspondence 
signified Venice’s nearly equal stature in dealing with Treviso in the fourteenth century. 
During the 1420s, the Venetians started to refer to their state as a dominium or signoria 
(Lordship).171 The fifteenth century Venetian mind associated dominium with Roman 
ideas of imperium.172 The often cited Ciceronian definition of imperium (“without which 
they [the Roman State] cannot wage war, govern military affairs, possess armies…”) 
does not suffice to describe Venice’s new language of dominion in the 1420s.173  
Republican Roman law, specifically the Lex Curiata, conferred the power of imperium. 
The Venetians followed a similar path in the fifteenth century to gain control over the 
timber resources of Terraferma polities. The shift from Commune to Signoria expressed 
Venice’s sovereignty over Terraferma and formalized Venice’s authority over mainland 
polities. 
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Figure 3.1: Serenissima Signoria c. 1423 
Venetian expansion at the beginning of the fifteenth century influenced the 
structure of the Venetian government in a similar fashion as the War of Chioggia. In 
1420, the Savii Grandi expanded by adding five secretaries of the mainland (Savii de 
Terraferma). The addition of five Terraferma secretaries granted the Collegio a steering 
committee for Terraferma legislation, including timber laws. The expansion of the 
Collegio to incorporate the Savii de Terraferma not only illustrated Venice’s commitment 
to the mainland, but also clearly demonstrates how the annexation of mainland polities 
changed the composition of the Venetian government. The Savii de Terraferma funneled 
legislation related to the security of the Republic directly to the Collegio. Such important 
legislation included forest legislation because the Venetians tied timber directly into the 
sovereignty of the Signoria. 
74 
 
Venetian policymakers understood timber in a very different manner than modern 
historians and foresters.174 Legname (timber) “simply meant ships” to the Venetian 
legislative bodies.175 The Venetian Republic limited its definition of timber to the 
specific species necessary for ship production. Timber language in the Venetian sources 
articulates the connection between oaks and beech to the stability and security of the 
Republic.176 In Venice, it was accepted knowledge that “oak is the first importance to our 
republic.”177 The Venetians did not separate the security of the Republic and forest 
legislation. The Venetian perception of timber and security partially explains why the 
powers associated with Terraferma forest laws grew incrementally in the fifteenth 
century.  
The Venetians issued a statement (capitulum) upon the annexation of a mainland 
city that often upheld the community’s local laws (statuti). However, the Venetians 
modified the laws of cities that proved to be problematic, like the aforementioned Padua. 
The Venetians allowed many of the timber-rich settlements to keep their local legal 
traditions after their incorporation into Terraferma. Timber-rich polities like Treviso and 
Belluno kept their local laws after Venetian annexation. Venice and its mainland cities 
differed on what legal powers incorporation into Terraferma entitled Venice to absorb. 
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The conflict originated in the differences in Northeastern Italy’s Roman legal heritage 
and Venice’s more flexible Byzantine legal code.  
The Venetians possessed a well-defined written system of laws. Like Venice 
itself, Venetian law comprised both Byzantine and Roman elements. Yet, Byzantine law 
formed the greater part of the Venetian legal system. The Venetians adapted their early 
legal system from Justinian’s corpus juris. The Justinian Code primarily addressed jus 
civile, “citizen law,” but also included important examples of law that governed natural 
resources. The closest example of what scholars would consider environmental law was 
Justinian’s public trust doctrine of coastlines. The public trust in Venice was most clearly 
articulated in the Venetian treatment of the waters of the lagoons and not in the timber 
resources of Terraferma.178 Venice’s Byzantine legal heritage provided the Republic with 
an adaptable system of laws.  
In comparison, Roman law was rigid and lacked the ability to modify with 
empirical evidence. Roman law should be classified as rigid because the Romans, and 
their successors, attempted to apply universal legal statutes to myriad Mediterranean 
cultures.179 Roman law addressed timber from as early as the establishment of the Twelve 
Tables.180 Yet, most of the timber laws found in the Republican era governed residential 
construction timber and not ship building timber. The Venetians implemented Roman 
legal concepts on sovereignty and citizenship as a means to insert their claims to 
mainland timber. 
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Venetian expansion onto the mainland required the city to become more 
familiarized with Terraferma’s Roman legal tradition. Unlike the rigidity of Roman law, 
based on codified precedence, Venetian law easily adapted to the mainland’s legal 
plurality.181 The Roman legal heritage of many mainland cities did not specifically 
address the ownership of common forestland, but did illuminate which entity held 
jurisdiction over a community’s natural resources. Venice was familiar with the 
administration of cities that possessed gray areas in their legal codes. Crete and Coron 
(Koroni, Greece) both lacked a written code of laws before the Venetians annexed them 
in the thirteenth century.182 Venice established legal systems in Crete and Messenia, 
whereas the Italian mainland already possessed written bodies of law. The strong legal 
tradition of mainland cities required the Venetians to manipulate Roman legal concepts in 
order to assert their interests in mainland timber supplies.   
Civitas was the most important legal concept brought forth from the Roman era 
for the legal relationship between Venice and its Terraferma polities. Civitas included the 
citizens (cives) of a sovereign polity, and is best defined as a settlement’s authority to 
enact laws, administer justice, and tax its cives without the approval of suzerain. Many of 
Venice’s fifteenth century Terraferma cities referred to themselves as a civitas. 183 The 
title granted the mainland settlements jurisdiction over a district and its natural resources. 
However, in the early fifteenth century, the Venetians began not to recognize the rights to 
timber resources associated with civitas. Upholding the civitas of mainland cities would 
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reinforce a local community’s claim to the administration of usufructuary rights of their 
natural resources, including timber. Steno’s 1410 letter was the first in a series of steps 
that challenged the ownership of mainland forests and divested the control of timber 
resources from local mainland communities. 
Polities that possessed a clearly defined Civitas challenged the Venetians on the 
mainland. The rapid expansion of Venetian Terraferma brought the Republic into conflict 
with the Milanese in 1425. Fillipo Maria’s string of victories over Florentine armies in 
Romagna encouraged the Florentines to seek Venetian aid once again. The Florentine 
envoy to Venice relied on sophistic rhetoric and bolstered claims that if Milan was left 
unchecked, the Visconti Viper would strip the liberty away from mainland cities. Their 
rhetoric would make their fellow Florentine Petrarch proud, but only vexed the 
Venetians. The always pragmatic Venetians curtly responded that “there are several 
reasons which render it undesirable to launch out into hostilities.”184 Yet Lorenzo Ridolfi, 
one of the Florentine diplomats, won over Doge Francesco Foscari by warning that 
Milanese expansion threatened Terraferma. Foscari asserted to the Collegio that it was 
Venice’s responsibility to defend the liberties of the mainland. Foscari asked, “Is it not 
our place to aid the distressed and jeopardized power? Shall we allow Filippo to lay a 
finger on the liberties of Florence…I say that the Venetian Empire ought not to remain a 
passive spectator of the present contest.”185 Foscari’s remarks on defending Florentine 
liberty enhanced the myth of Venice and contradicted Steno’s manipulation of Belluno in 
1410. The Venetians certainly protected Terraferma polities, but these polities sacrificed 
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certain liberties for Venetian protection. With Steno’s request to Belluno, one of these 
sacrificed freedoms was a community’s ownership over forest resources. 
The 1425 Florentine alliance precipitated a series of wars between Venice and 
Milan in the 1420s and 1430s. Venetian expansion onto the mainland strengthened a 
“natural hatred” between St. Mark’s Republic and Milan.186 The Milanese-Venetian wars 
in Lombardy quickly became a naval conflict. Venetian galleons, specifically designed 
for riverine warfare, patrolled the Adige and Adda rivers. Armed with cannon, the 
Venetians captured several strategic forts along the Adige and relieved the besieged 
Brescians by bombarding the Milanese from Lake Garda.187 Not to be outdone, Filippo 
Maria attempted to destroy Venice’s naval capacity by setting the Arsenale ablaze. 
Fortunately for Venice, the Arsenale workers prevented the burning of the Arsenale and 
quickly caught the arsonist. Marino Sanuto related that the Venetians tortured him to 
death because of the Arsenale’s central importance to the Venetian Republic.188 The 
Venetian galleons on Lake Garda contributed to the success of the Florentine-Venetian 
siege of Brescia and forced the Milanese to sue for peace in 1426. 
The first Lombard war with Milan concluded in 1428 with the peace of Ferrara. 
Milan ceded Bergamo and Brescia to Venice in 1428. The Venetians granted the 
Brescians a wide range of freedoms that it withheld from the timber cities of Treviso and 
Belluno. Indeed, Brescia lost control of its civil offices, but unlike Belluno, retained 
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jurisdiction over its rural hinterland (contadi).189 Brescia possessed stands of oak and 
beech that were appropriate for the Arsenale, but posed transportation difficulties. The 
accessibility of timber in the contadi of Treviso and Belluno granted the Venetians some 
incentive to control how both settlements governed their rural districts.  
Brescia’s position near the western terminus of Terraferma and its proximity to 
Milan allowed the Viscontis to besiege the city in 1438. The Brescians repelled the 
Milanese siege with the aid of Venetian commanders. Brescia viewed the Venetians as 
liberators, whose “virtues equaled, if not surpassed, those of the Romans.”190 Such 
statements by distant Terraferma polities aided Doge Foscari’s vision for Venice as the 
protector of Terraferma liberty. Maintaining the image as protector required the 
Venetians to implement tactful and less intrusive timber policies in the early fifteenth 
century. Steno’s 1410 letter is an example of Venice’s approach. Steno requested, “on 
account of the complaints having been made by our timber merchants… We request ye 
[the Cadorini] to accept my recommendation concerning the timber merchants by 
yielding to their requests.”191 Venetian timber policy was a reflection of the changing 
political relationships between Venice and Terraferma polities. As Venice defined its 
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political control of the mainland more concretely in the middle of the fifteenth century, 
the formulation of timber policy became more fully articulated and intrusive. 
Venice’s role as liberator of Terraferma contradicted the Republic’s manipulation 
of law for timber resources, thus maintaining positive relations with mainland 
communities was a component of Venetian timber policy. Other mainland powers closely 
examined Venetian annexations of mainland settlements. Although the extermination of 
the Carraresi family was an unprecedented move by the Venetians, the Carraresi 
thoroughly irritated the Florentines as well. Some Florentines concluded that Da Carrara 
earned his fate.192 Milan and Florence annexed neighboring polities in a similar fashion 
and it was hypocritical for both cities to criticize Venice.  Such claims contradicted 
Florentine actions, because the Florentines often required their subjects to conduct 
elaborate acts of homage.193 The Florentine and Venetian Republics justified their 
conquests as a means to protect “one’s own libertas against real or hypothetical 
attacks.”194 The Venetians and Florentines allied against Milan to protect their civic and 
political freedoms. Florence slew its Goliath in Milan, but was unable to capitalize on the 
war like the Venetians. The Florentines questioned the necessity of Venice’s annexation 
of Brescia and asked themselves if Venice intended to annex Milan next.195 Venice’s 
relationships with other mainland powers directly influenced the security of Terraferma. 
                                                 
192 Rubinstein, “Italian Reactions to Terraferma expansion,” 199. 
193 John E. Law, “The Venetian Mainland State in the Fifteenth Century,” Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 6, no. 2 (1992): 162. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Giovanni Cavalcanti, Storie Fiorentine, ed. F. Polidori (Florence: Tipographia All’Insegna Di Dante 
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Likewise, Venice’s relationships with timber polities was important for maintaining the 
Arsenale’s timber supply. 
Venice developed its relationships with each mainland polity separately. The 
Venetians incorporated settlements into Terraferma generally by three methods. Each 
method greatly dictated the city’s future relationship with Venice. Cities often willed 
themselves to Venice for military protection and commercial ties. Treviso and Belluno 
both voluntarily relinquished their civitas and Venice incorporated these polities into 
Terraferma. Direct conquest during wars with neighboring powers served as the second 
method of Venetian annexation. The Venetians annexed Venzone, Udine, and other 
important timber centres in Friuli in wars with Hungaria. The outright purchase of cities 
served as the third method Venice used to incorporate cities into its mainland holdings. 
Buying cities was less expensive than hiring condottieri to take the city by force. The 
Venetians often applied this method to annex cities outside of Terraferma. For example, 
Venice purchased Corfu in 1384 and, as previously mentioned, Dalmatia in 1409.196 
Sigismund’s contestation of Dalmatia forced the Venetians to legitimize their 
purchase with force. After a protracted war, Venice wrested Dalmatia from Sigismund in 
1437. The conquest of Dalmatia granted the Arsenale another avenue for timber 
resources. Venice claimed an interest in Dalmatian forests relatively quickly by the right 
of conquest. Venetian political language clearly portrayed Venice as holding legal 
possession over important Dalmatian timber ports.197 Yet, Dalmatian timber was 
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expensive and Venetian shipbuilders considered it “to be of lesser quality.”198 The 
Venetians developed a policy of acquiring legal ownership of mainland forests, partially 
because Dalmatia could not supply all of the Arsenale’s ship-timber needs. Terraferma 
polities provided the Venetians with the least expensive and most readily accessible 
Arsenale-grade timber.  
A timber shortage in the 1430s and 1440s encouraged the development of new 
forms of timber policy. The shortage included ship-timber, but centered upon firewood 
for heating and Venetian industries. The Council of Ten commissioned several patricians 
to monitor the conditions of forests along the Piave, Sile, and Tagliamento.199 One of the 
inspectors, Marco Corner, published an important treatise on the conditions of 
Terraferma’s forest in 1442. Corner’s treatise opens a window into how the Venetian 
mind understood Terraferma timber and forest conservation. Corner also illustrated that 
the Venetians possessed relatively accurate knowledge of the health of Terraferma’s 
riparian forests. 
Appuhn described the document as remarkably technical, but flawed in its 
interpretation of Terraferma’s timber landscapes. He also stated that Corner’s treatise 
“clearly demonstrates that after nearly four decades of mainland rule, the Venetians still 
knew relatively little about the sources of the city’s timber and fuel.”200 Such an 
assessment is an unfair appraisal of Venetian forest knowledge. Venetian correspondence 
to the podestás of timber settlements indicates the Venetian government’s familiarity 
with the sources of Arsenale and fuel timber. Steno’s 1410 letter specifically addressed 
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the relationship between Belluno and Venetian timber merchants. Appuhn questioned 
whether the Venetian policymakers comprehended the issues facing their Terraferma 
forests. Corner’s treatise and the anonymous 1413 work on Terraferma timber indicate 
that Venetians knew much more about their forests than other Renaissance naval powers. 
In 1413, an anonymous treatise detailed the deteriorating condition of Terraferma 
forest resources.201 Deforestation was the most pressing concern for the Arsenale’s ship-
timber supply. The treatise asserts that mainland deforestation occurred with the Venetian 
conquest.202 The author illustrated the Venetian patriciate’s technical knowledge of 
Terraferma’s forests by connecting the denudation of forest resources with the siltation of 
rivers. The 1413 work demonstrates a comprehension of the connections between 
unsustainable timber harvest techniques and water-induced soil erosion. The Dalmatian 
timber ports experienced a similar spike in soil erosion due, in part, to timber harvests.203 
Widespread soil erosion induced by forest use was not just limited to Terraferma.204 The 
anonymous report also suggested replanting the mainland’s riparian corridors as a policy 
solution. The Venetian government possibly recognized deforestation, but the commune 
possessed no legal authority to dictate conservation measures to cities along the Piave or 
Tagliamento in the 1410s.  
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Marco Corner’s 1442 report on Terraferma’s forests echoed similar problems 
with deforestation of the anonymous 1413 treatise. Corner also emphasized the 
deforestation of the mainland’s forests. When he presented his findings to the Collegio, 
Corner suggested two policy solutions to address the denudation and subsequent siltation 
of Terraferma’s watersheds. The first solution, dredging, was already in practice.205 
Corner proposed replanting the watersheds as a second solution. Corner recognized how 
siltation adversely affected Venetian mainland commerce, including the timber trade. The 
shallow bed of silted rivers would block the transportation of timber. An example of the 
siltation of a Terraferma river occurred in the modern era. Deposits in the Tagliamento in 
the past 200 years caused the river to become more shallow and braided.206 Corner 
prompted the Collegio to take more intrusive steps in order to secure timber for the 
Arsenale. 
Firewood shortages and Corner’s report spurred the Venetian government into a 
policy of direct control of Terraferma’s forests.207 By 1442, Venice controlled the 
important timber watersheds and the Venetian government expanded in order to cement 
its hold over the mainland and expedite Terraferma policy measures. The market controls 
on Terraferma timber of 1350 and 1372 did not grant Venice control over the mainland’s 
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forest resources.208 However, Venice expanded its dominance over Terraferma in the 
1440s and 1450s.  In 1444 the Venetians removed the local military governor (Capitano) 
of Cadore from his post and replaced him with a Venetian official.209 The installation of a 
Venetian to govern the contado of Cadore expanded Venice’s access to the Silver Fir 
forests of Cadore and challenged the original capitulum to Cadore from 1424. The 
capitulum left Cadore’s municipal council alone and granted the city relief from 
commercial tariffs and taxes.210 Cadore accepted the new military administrator because 
the city depended on Venice for trade and defense. The seizure of the Cadore’s contadi 
extended to Belluno and established the precedence for future Venetian revisions of 
Cadorini and Bellunese local law and seizures of mainland forests. 
Venetian manipulation of local laws and offices made rival Italian powers 
suspicious of Venetian intentions for the mainland. Venice, Milan, and Florence 
continued to dominate the politics of Northeastern Italy in the 1440s. The death of 
Filippo Maria in 1447 threatened to upset the balance of power between the three cities. 
The Florentines quickly grew suspicious of the Venetians and Cosimo de Medici (il 
Vecchio) stirred up anti-Venetian sentiments in Florence. Cosimo’s initial outcries 
against Venetian imperialism set the foundation for generations of scholars to criticize 
Venice’s involvement in Terraferma. The contemporary humanist scholar Paggio 
                                                 
208 Appuhn argues that the market controls “failed to resolve timber and firewood issues…” Appuhn, A 
Forest on the Sea, 80–83. 
209 Antonio Ronzon, Archivio Storico Cadorino: periodico mensile (Lodi: Tipo- litografia dell’ avo, 1898), 
67. 
210 Alexander Robertson, Through the Dolomites (London: Allen and Sons, 1903), 5–7. 
86 
 
Bracciolini blamed Venetian ambition for causing conflict between Milan and Venice.211 
Pope Pius II feared that the Venetians “would attack all of Italy” if given the chance to 
annex Milan.212 Accusations of Venetian imperialism undermined Venice’s persona as 
protector of Terraferma. In response, the Venetians pointed at the imperialistic actions of 
Florence and Milan. Venice expanded to ensure its own libertas and to combat “force 
with force.”213 In the absence of a strong Milan, rivalry between Florence and Venice 
colored the contemporary interpretation of Venice’s growing power in Terraferma. 
Terraferma’s timber resources were a part of Venice’s ascending influence on the 
mainland and any outright seizure of forest resources would color the arguments over 
Venetian imperialistic ambitions. 
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Figure 3.2: Venetian Terraferma c. 1450. Adapted from the University of Oregon 
Mapping History site (http://pages.uoregon.edu/mapplace/EU/EU19%20-
%20Italy/Maps/EU19_128.jpg).  
The Venetians expanded their rights to Cadore’s forests in 1453. The Venetian 
Senate requested that the local city council deliver a large supply of Silver Fir to the 
Arsenale. Venice noted that the Republic continually granted Cadore protection and that 
any assistance rendered by the alpine community would be greatly appreciated.214 The 
Senate’s tone illustrates that the local Cadorini government still controlled its forest 
resources and they granted the Venetians usufructory rights. Cadore complied with the 
Senate’s wishes and illustrated Venice’s growing influence over the distant timber polity. 
The arrangement was not entirely imperialistic because both cities benefitted from the 
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association. Cadore granted Venice access to the German markets across the Alps and 
supplied the Venetians with timber and iron. The Venetians provided the Cadorini with 
an outlet for their marketable goods. Mainland cities saw protection and stability in 
Venetian rule, but events in the Eastern Mediterranean changed Venice’s approach to 
mainland timber policy. 
Successful Ottoman advances in Bulgaria and the Peloponnesus encouraged 
Constantine XI to seek aid from the western Latins. The approach of the Ottoman forces 
prompted several Venetians to disobey orders from the Senate in February 1453 to stay 
and support the defense.215 Likewise, the leading Venetians in Constantinople voted to 
remain and support the Byzantines in their defense of the city.216 The Venetians 
demonstrated a stronger commitment to the security of the Byzantines than all other 
Western Christian powers. The Senate seized the initiative and ordered five ships to the 
defense of the city in April.  
Two men fashioned Venetian strategy for the Eastern Mediterranean in the middle 
of the fifteenth century. Doge Tomaso Mocenigo in his famous 1421 oration warned 
against an expansion of Venetian involvement in mainland affairs and advocated for a 
renewed focus on maritime exploits. Mocenigo’s successor, the aforementioned 
Francesco Foscari, supported mainland expansion and likely did not equate mainland 
wars with the ruining of the Eastern Empire. Although Foscari served as Doge during the 
1450s, Venetian strategy took elements of both Mocenigo’s and Foscari’s vision for 
Venetian strategy. 
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Venice’s strategy in protecting the Byzantines served several purposes at once. 
First, protecting Venetian trade inlets into the Black Sea required the Venetians to 
maintain the tractable Byzantine leadership in Constantinople. Secondly, several hundred 
Venetian merchant families resided in Constantinople. The Venetians often implemented 
military force outside of Italy to protect Venetian citizens, as evidenced by their treatment 
of the Native Greeks in several revolts on Candia (Crete). Lastly, a secure Eastern 
Mediterranean bolstered the Trans-Alpine Terraferma trade routes. 
Venice’s role as guardian of the Eastern Mediterranean’s trade networks made 
Terraferma and its timber a crucial component in Venetian strategy. The Stato da Már, or 
Venetian Maritime Empire, formed a symbiotic relationship with Venetian Terraferma. 
Eastern markets, such as Constantinople, benefited from the Trans-Alpine trade in iron 
and raw materials that hinged upon Venice.217  Terraferma oak, fir, and beech provided 
the materials for Venetian state trade vessels that conveyed luxury goods to German 
markets.  
A single ship silenced the entire Venetian Senate on the morning of July 29, 1453. 
The ship carried news of the fall of Constantinople. The Collegio suspended the morning 
session and the Venetians released courier pigeons to spread the news throughout 
Northern Italy.218 The sacking of Constantinople by the Turks placed Venetians and 
citizens of Terraferma polities directly in danger. The news utterly shocked the Venetians 
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who could not “believe that the Turks could bring a fleet against Constantinople.”219  The 
request for Cadorini timber was part of the preparation for war with the Turks in the east. 
Likewise, the promulgation of Terraferma timber law dominates the narrative of 
Venice’s relationship with the mainland in the late fifteenth century.  
Timber management and policy is an underappreciated aspect of the Venetian-
Ottoman wars. The naval engagements of Sapienza, Djerba, and Lepanto required the 
consumption of at least several thousand trees. Both the Venetians and Ottomans 
maintained specific policies for the acquisition of timber. The Ottomans faced similar 
challenges in procuring timber as the Venetians, but it was clear to contemporary 
observers that the conquest of Anatolia granted the Ottomans fine reserves of ship-
timber.220 In the 1450s, the Ottoman timber supplies seemed infinite to Christian 
observers.221 The Ottomans made the Venetians apprehensive about the security of their 
Eastern Mediterranean Empire and prompted the Arsenale to stockpile ship-timber. The 
Arsenale outfitted the Venetian “limes,” the string of coastal resupply ports, with oars, 
gunpowder, wheat, and men.222 The Arsenale required properly seasoned timber and 
called upon the forests of Terraferma to supply it.  
In 1463, the Venetians once again requested finished Silver Fir from Cadore and 
Belluno. The Venetians implemented the right to reserve (diritto di reserva) in order to 
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claim rights to a prime stand of Belluno fir near the Piave. Mainland Italian republics 
often used the diritto di reserva to muster any unused natural resources for the defense of 
the res publica.223 Invoking the diritto expanded the previous timber rights granted to 
Venice by Belluno in 1410 and Cadore in 1453, and created a mast reserve, called the 
Bosca della Vizza, for the Arsenale. The act did not exclude other users from the forest 
but the diritto guaranteed Venice’s usufructuory rights to Cadore’s forests. The diritto 
served as Venice’s legal formalization of Steno’s 1410 letter and other similar 
concessions by the Cadorini. The Bosca della Vizza reserve granted the Venetians a 
guaranteed source of ship masts for future naval conflicts. The diritto served as an 
important precedent for future claims to Terraferma’s timber.   
The right to reserve likely originated with the Republican Roman concept of Ager 
occupatorius (land annexed after victory). Land that the Roman Republic conquered fell 
into the collection of Ager publici (public lands) but the Republic retained the right to 
claim the land back at any time.224 Roman land law divided usable timberland in Silvia 
caedua, harvestable woodlands, and Silvia pascua, oak woodlands suitable for 
rangeland.225 The Terraferma polities inherited transmuted versions of Roman land law. 
Like Roman law, the mainland settlements possessed contadi that primarily consisted of 
agrian laws, with very limited laws to govern harvestable timberland. In contrast, the 
Venetian legal tradition did not incorporate agrian laws, but addressed timber from the 
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foundation of the city. Consummate lawyers, the Venetians implemented the dirrito di 
reserva to fill the vacuum in Terraferma timber law. 
 
Figure 3.3: Vizza and Montello Forest Reserves. Source: Google Earth. 
The dirrito di reserva only allowed the Venetians to consume unused natural 
resources for the defense of the res publica during acute emergencies. Any outright 
attempt to confiscate Cadore’s forests would not only irritate the Cadorini, but also 
damaged Venice’s image as protector of Terraferma. In order to successfully use the 
dirrito, the Venetians defined the terms unused and res publica. Several local 
communities also used Cadore’s timber resources, but no legal mechanism existed that 
explicitly denoted who owned Cadorini forests. The Venetians and cities incorporated 
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into Terraferma distorted the meanings of res publica to secure legal rights. Some 
polities, like Vicenza, claimed more local autonomy by labeling themselves a res 
publica.226 Venice followed a similar pattern by recognizing a city’s claim when it was 
most convenient for the Republic.  
Venice’s implementation of the dirrito di reserva in 1463 was legally justified for 
three reasons.  First, the timber harvested at Cadore directly contributed to the defense of 
the Venetian and Terraferma polities’ res publica. Secondly, the Venetians adhered to 
legal conditions set to enact the diritto. Finally, the rapid expansion of the Ottomans 
granted the Venetians a legal justification for enacting the dirrito. The Ottoman conquest 
of the Peloponnese constituted a state of emergency and the Collegio essentially framed 
the legal question of who owns Cadore’s forests by linking it with the naval security of 
the Eastern Mediterranean.227  
The Venetians developed a pattern of using Ottoman successes in the east as an 
excuse to denote ship-timber reserves in Terraferma. Ottoman victories fit well within 
the definition of an acute emergency and gave the Venetians the excuse to exercise the 
dirrito. The Ottomans engulfed Wallachia in 1462 and Bosnia in 1463.228 In 1469, a 
Venetian merchant, Piero Dolfin, tipped off the Venetians to an imminent attack on 
Negroponte by the Ottomans.229 The Senate ordered the Arsenale to prepare the Venetian 
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navy. The Arsenale drew upon Terraferma’s forests to fulfill the Senate’s orders. The 
Arsenale supplied beech oars and fir masts for reserved ships and organized the 
distribution of gunpowder to active ships.  
The production of a Venetian vessel from harvest to outfitting was a highly 
organized process that required the Arsenale to maintain secure, steady supplies of oak, 
fir, and beech. The Arsenale also demanded supplies of hemp and wine, but timber was 
the primary concern for Venetian suppliers.230 Although the Arsenale possessed the 
capability to crank out one fully battle-ready vessel within several hours, ship-timber 
required at least several months to several years to season correctly.231 Ship wrights 
ventured into the forest to select the trees for the Arsenale. Once selected, local laborers 
felled the trees and the Venetians negotiated for the transport of the specimens down one 
of the major Terraferma timber rivers. Once fully seasoned, ship carpenters supervised 
the cutting of the timber by the Arsenale’s sawyers.232  Thus, the mobilization of 
Negroponte’s defense placed the most pressure on Terraferma’s forests several months to 
a year after 1469, once the Arsenale required green timber for the seasoning process.  
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Figure 3.4: Venetian Euboea. Adapted from Texas A&M University Nautical 
Archeology 2005 Euboea Season 
(http://nautarch.tamu.edu/pwss/2005%20Season/2005%20Season.html). 
Negroponte was the political centre of the island of Euboea and served as the base 
of operations for Venetian commercial and naval operations in the Northern Aegean. The 
Ottomans began their assault on Negroponte in June 1470. Venetian witnesses described 
the sheer magnitude of the Ottoman navy as “a forest upon the sea.”233 Upon hearing 
Mehmet’s initial demand for the surrender of the city, the Venetians responded “go and 
eat marranos (piglets) and we shall meet you in the ditch.”234 The Ottoman Bombards 
served as Mehemt’s response to the insult. Led by the gifted lawyer Niccolò Da Canal, a 
Venetian navy of 71 ships arrived to relieve the city in July. However, Da Canal was 
indecisive in his attack on the vulnerable Ottoman position and fled once the Ottomans 
took the city.  
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The loss of Negroponte shook Venetian forest policy more than the loss of 
Constantinople. Upon receiving the news, the Collegio immediately replaced Da Canal 
with Pietro Mocenigo. The Venetians also sent envoys throughout Italy in order to form 
an Italian-wide alliance against the Ottomans. Doge Christoforo Moro wrote to the 
Milanese signori, Galeazzo-Maria Sforza, to encourage Christian unity in the face of the 
virulent rise of the Muslim Ottomans.235 Moro’s gesture allowed the Venetians to secure 
the western border of Terraferma by renewing the terms of the Peace of Lodi. 
Negroponte illustrated that Venice could not afford to toy with the ascending Ottoman 
naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Collegio also expanded the operations 
of the Arsenale. In order to supply timber for the growth of the Arsenale, the Collegio 
exerted more control over Terraferma’s forests. 
The Venetians implemented the dirrito di reserva to gain direct access to fir 
resources, but did not yet claim legal rights to an oak forest. In 1471, the Senate invoked 
the dirrito to claim a substantial oak forest near Treviso.236  The new oak reserve was 
situated on Montello, a hill ten miles west of Treviso. Montello possessed a readily 
available supply of oak and its proximity to the Sile River aided the transportation of 
timber to the Arsenale. The Montello ban granted the Arsenale control of a nearby supply 
of their most crucial tree species and allowed the Collegio to legally claim a forest 
previously owned by a Terraferma polity.  
The 1471 Montello ban illustrated the change in Venice’s relationship with 
Terraferma timber settlements since Steno’s letter in 1410. Steno suggested to the 
                                                 
235 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Arm. 39, Tom. 12, quoted in Crowley, City of Fortune, 343. 
236 ASV, Senato Terra, Reg. 6.  
97 
 
podestá of Cadore to aid Venetian timber merchants, whereas the Collegio claimed direct 
authority over Montello in 1472. The use of the dirrito to claim Montello also differed 
from the 1453 claim of the Bosca della Vizza near Cadore. The mast reserve at Bosca 
della Vizza did not exclude other users from the fir forest. The new oak reserve at 
Montello gave the Arsenale exclusive rights to the forest. The Venetians later reinforced 
the Arsenale’s sole ownership of Montello by fining or whipping anyone caught entering 
the forest with felling instruments.237  Using the dirrito again allowed the Venetian 
government to reinforce their legal claim to Terraferma’s forests and broadened the 
authority of the dirrito. However, the broadening of the dirrito in Treviso resulted in 
problems with the local populace. 
The citizens of Treviso were not fond of the Venetian seizure of the Montello. 
The dirrito severely limited a Trevisan’s access to the hill. Settlements around Montello 
collected firewood and green fertilizer and pastured their animals there. In order to 
produce firewood, villagers coppiced maturing trees.238 Coppicing a tree permanently 
rendered that specimen useless for the Arsenale. Villagers pastured their animals in the 
Montello because of the forest’s abundance of chestnuts. They also pollarded trees to 
produce fodder for their livestock.239 The dirrito ended these firewood and pastoral 
privileges of nearby communities. Communities could still petition the Arsenale for the 
collection of firewood, but the Arsenale firmly controlled all access to Montello.  
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The Venetians interpreted the “unused resources” clause of the dirritto di reserva 
to justify the seizure of Montello. The Arsenale viewed Montello as strictly an oak 
reserve, and not a public rangeland for Trevisan peasants. Allowing livestock, especially 
pigs, to graze in the Montello was ruinous for oak seedlings. In the minds of Venetian 
administrators pasturing animals in the forest made the forest an unused resource, 
because making ship-timber was the best use of forest resources.240 Certainly the local 
communities used the forest resources, but the Arsenale’s goals did not support a multi-
use forest model. The Arsenale intended to use Montello as the nursery for growing an 
armada to face Venice’s rivals, including the Ottomans.  
Almost immediately after the establishment of the Montello oak reserve, local 
inhabitants resisted the Arsenale’s authority. Villagers were unwilling to relinquish the 
usufructory rights to the common forest that their ancestors held since before Treviso’s 
incorporation into Terraferma. Resistance took the form of cutting down Arsenale-grade 
oaks, letting livestock out into the Montello, or deliberately coppicing oaks for firewood. 
A monastery that dispensed alms in the middle of Montello provided more clever 
individuals a handy excuse when caught in the forest by Venetian officials. Offenders 
often claimed they entered into the forests to receive alms, rather than to fell timber.241 
The resistance encouraged the Venetian Senate to establish fines for trespassers in the 
Montello. One Draconian fine required an unauthorized forest user to pay 25 lire di 
piccolo and serve two months in prison for every piece of wood cut.242 The fines were 
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stopgap measures that only addressed issues with local users near Montello and did not 
extend to other Terraferma forests. The Venetians used the Montello fines as a model to 
regulate all forests capable of producing Arsenale timber.  
The Senate implemented the legal precedence of the diritto di reserva to enact six 
forest laws in 1476. The laws governed the usage of forest resources and placed the 
Venetians in direct control of all of Terraferma’s community forests. It is best to examine 
each law separately in order to more efficiently parse what each law achieved.243 The first 
law provided statutes for sustainable timber harvests. The Senate required Terraferma 
community forests to annually rotate timber harvests throughout ten coupes. Thus, the 
Arsenale only harvested each section of a forest once every decade. Corner’s 1442 
treatise reinforced the notion that ship-timber was a finite resource. The division of 
mainland forests illustrates that the Venetian government earnestly examined Corner’s 
proposal, but needed to establish a legal precedence to administer all Terraferma forests. 
The first law is an example of how Venetian timber policy evolved into positive 
conservation measures for Terraferma’s forests. Forestry developed as “a graft on the 
great rootstock of European agronomy.”244 The rotating harvest statute allowed the 
Arsenale to manage Terraferma’s community forests as a sustainable crop. In a similar 
fashion as a Crimean wheat crop, the Venetians protected mainland forests until 
specimens matured into a harvestable size. Corner and the anonymous 1413 treatise 
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raised alarm at the deforestation of Terraferma’s forests and connected deforestation with 
soil erosion. The Senate attempted to fix deforestation and soil erosion by mandating the 
division of forests into coupes with the 1476 law.   
The second law addressed the selling and purchasing of common forests. The 
Senate forbade the sale or abandonment of any Terraferma community forest. Prior to 
1476, a mainland polity could sell sections of the commons to a group of users or a single 
individual.245 The second law also built upon the regulatory fines put into place after the 
Montello ban. The Venetian Senate imposed a 100 ducat fine on any polity caught selling 
its common timberland. The fine was sizable for any polity, but the Venetians provided 
amnesty to polities who reneged on any sale of public forests within a month of the 
enactment of the 1476 laws.246 The Venetians fully realized the difficulty in dealing with 
private forest owners during timber purchases. Consolidating the ownership of forests 
into the hands of local polities expedited the acquisition of ship-timber by the Arsenale. 
The third law banned several destructive agricultural practices. Community 
members could no longer use common forests to pasture their livestock. The law also 
barred the practice of assarting forest lands.247 The spike in population and subsequent 
expansion of agricultural intensity in Terraferma contributed to the deforestation of 
Arsenale timber species. Assarting timberland was a major concern for the Venetian 
Arsenale because the practice permanently removed timberlands and their associated 
ship-timber. The law prescribed substantial fines for any person caught assarting common 
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forests. The typical fine was a payment of 100 ducats and six months of service as 
rower.248 Such punishments encouraged adherence because either the fine would indebt 
the offender or the rowing would kill him. 
The Venetians sought to stymie the deforestation of Terraferma’s forests with the 
ban on pasturing livestock and burning off sections of the forest. The conversion of 
timberland into fields increased soil erosion and aggravated the impact of precipitation.249 
The loss of the mainland forests impacted every facet of the Venetian economy. 
Firewood was already a scarce commodity by the 1440s, and Venetian industries utterly 
depended upon mainland charcoal producers. Soil erosion, if left unchecked, would make 
portions of the mainland rivers unnavigable for trading vessels. The 1476 laws served as 
positive conservation measures that attempted to halt anthropogenic environmental 
degradation. 
The fourth law bolstered Venice’s authority over the oak reserve at Montello. The 
law required timber suppliers from Montello to transport timber directly to Venice 
without stopping along the Sile to sell portions of their harvest. The law was a 
commodity control measure and the Senate likely modeled it after the earlier Adriatic 
cereals laws and the 1350 Arsenale selection law. Statutes of the law also provided 
guidelines for fines that left offenders literally up the stream without a paddle, or in their 
case, a boat. The Venetian dominance over Terraferma’s forests included control over the 
exchange of timber resources. Because the Venetians closely associated timber with the 
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defense of res publica, manipulation of the mainland timber market fell within the 
parameters of the diritto di reserva. 
The fifth law expanded Venice’s firewood warehouse near the Arsenale. The 
expansion of the firewood warehouse did not directly impact the Arsenale’s forest 
reserves, but the acquisition of steady supplies of firewood was necessary. The firewood 
supply was a form of social welfare because the provveditori alle legne (Firewood 
mangers) distributed firewood in the winter to poor residents. The Venetians experienced 
a shortage of firewood well into the beginning of the fifteenth century. The third law that 
prohibited assarting and pasturing livestock in forests also prevented the loss of firewood 
reserves. However, the Arsenale reserves managed Terraferma forests for ship-timber, 
and did not implement cutting techniques, like coppicing, to promote the growth of 
firewood. No firewood managers participated in the management of Terraferma 
forests.250 The exclusion of any regulation of the firewood market within the six 1476 
laws is indicative of the Arsenale’s firm control of Terraferma forest policy. 
The sixth law possessed the most pervasive legal repercussions for Terraferma’s 
forests. The law declared that the Arsenale’s requirements for any ship-timber species 
takes precedence over any of the prior five laws.251 Providing the Arsenale jurisdiction 
over the mainland’s forests shaped how the forests of Northern Italy developed. Although 
it would be difficult to determine the connection between Arsenale activities and future 
forest growth patterns, Venetian forest law developed to favor a specific management 
approach. The Venetian government protected oak, beech, and fir stands in order to 
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provide for the defense of the res publica. The Venetians marginalized species unsuitable 
for ship-timber and quite possibly contributed to the decline of endemic flora species, like 
the Padua Rue. 
The genesis for the 1476 forest laws resided with Venice’s initial connection to 
Treviso in 1339. In the early fourteenth century, the Venetians exhibited a passive system 
of management of the mainland. The Venetians afforded a wide breadth of legal rights to 
Treviso. Conflict with Genoa hindered Venetian trade and induced Venetian expansion 
onto the mainland in order to protect the Republic’s mainland commercial ties. Wars with 
Padua, Hungaria, and Milan encouraged the Venetians to abandon their previous passive 
management of the mainland and to develop a policy of resource conservation. Venice 
clearly demonstrated its abandonment of its passive system of management through the 
termination of the Carraresi family. Although Venetian annexations were often the result 
of mainland wars, the Republic’s Terraferma policy followed a concerted plan to secure 
mainland commerce and to bolster its mainland frontier. Timber was a strategic 
commercial mainland resource that Venetian expansionistic polices protected. 
The conquest of Terraferma did not grant Venice direct control over the 
mainland’s timber resources. Dominating community forests required the Venetians to 
first insert themselves into the mainland’s Roman legal heritage. In the early fifteenth 
century, the Venetians began asserting their legal claims to timber into mainland law by 
modifying the language of dominion, using Roman legal concepts to their advantage, and 
by implementing the dirrito di reserva. Ottomon victories at Constantinople (1453) and 
Negroponte (1471) granted the Venetians an appropriate excuse to extend their control of 
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Terraferma timber. The dirrito allowed the Venetians to establish a beech reserve near 
Belluno and Cadore in 1453 and an oak reserve at Montello near Treviso in 1471.  
The six forest laws of 1476 were a continuation of the Arsenale’s successful 
attempts to expand its legal rights to mainland forests between 1410 and 1471. The six 
laws provided the guide for all future Venetian forest laws. The Florentine who remarked 
that Venetian laws last for seven days was certainly not a student of Venetian forest laws. 
Venetian law afforded the Arsenale legal authority over key ship-timber stands that lasted 
well into the eighteenth century. The dispossession of the rights of previous local forest 
users always handicapped the Arsenale’s ability to procure appropriate timber specimens, 
but nevertheless throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Venetians 
developed a corpus of forest laws that granted the Arsenale legal control of forest 
resources. 
The origins of the 1476 laws resided with two Venetians decisions in the 
fourteenth century. First, the decision to annex Treviso in 1339 signified Venice’s 
willingness to solidify market connections to the mainland. Although Venice did not 
annex Treviso simply for the mainland’s timber trade, Treviso’s favorable role as conduit 
of the Sile and lower Piave timber trade was a crucial benefit afforded to Venice. Second, 
Venice veered from its passive management of Treviso and the mainland with the 
execution of the Carraresi family in 1406. The execution was unprecedented in Venetian 
history and serves as the most appropriate starting point for periodizing Venetian 
Terraferma. Conflicts with the Carraresi, Genoa, and Milan illustrated chinks in the 
Venetian mainland armour and, in response, Venice formulated a program of mainland 
protection and resource conservation.  
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Venetian expansion onto the mainland did not directly divest local communities’ 
ownership of forest resources. The Venetian Republic acquired rights to mainland timber 
by inserting its claims into Terraferma’s legal heritage. The manipulation of local statutes 
for the domination of natural resources was not a new Venetian tactic and was likely 
perfected with the development of Venice’s legal control of the Adriatic wheat trade in 
the eleventh century. Venice’s role as protector of the mainland required the Republic to 
modify its language of dominion in order to grant the city a firm legal grounding for 
outright seizures of timber in 1463 at Vizza and in 1471 at Montello near Treviso. The 
bans at Montello and Vizza resulted in positive forest conditions for the Arsenale, but 
upset disenfranchised local forest users.   
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EPILOGUE: “WHO OWNS THE FOREST?” 
Ultimately, the narrative of Venetian forest law provides modern foresters and 
policymakers with valuable lessons in forest policymaking. In 1910, the European-trained 
father of American Forestry Gifford Pinchot declared that America was experiencing a 
timber carestia, or famine. “America has already crossed the verge of a timber famine so 
severe that its blighting effects will be felt in every household in the land.”252 Pinchot 
echoed the sentiments of Marco Corner’s 1442 report to the Venetian Senate. Venetian 
timber shortages in the 1340’s and 1440’s disrupted fire fuel supplies and in part, 
encouraged the promulgation of timber regulations. Venice’s first timber regulations 
targeted the timber market within Venice because the Republic did not yet possess the 
legal authority on the mainland.  
The Venetian conquest of Terraferma and the Republic’s manipulation of 
mainland law slowly answered the same question facing American forests in the early 
twentieth century: “Who owns the forest?” Pinchot’s utilitarian vision for America’s 
forests served as America’s response. That is, “using the forest first for the greatest good 
of the present generation, and then for the greatest good of succeeding generations.”253 
Fifteenth century Venetians reached a conclusion through in an entirely different mode of 
thinking. Venice valued timber for its role in the defense of the Republic and 
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implemented the dirrito to assert that the Arsenale legally owned common timberland for 
the defense of Terraferma. The manner in which the Venetians and twentieth century 
utilitarians defined forest ownership provides modern foresters and policymakers with 
valuable lessons. 
That societal needs often influence forest conditions is the first valuable lesson. 
Modern foresters often fall back upon their scientific training to fix forest problems and 
neglect the societal conditions that first caused the problem. The dominance of the 
Arsenale within Venetian forest law was a reflection of timber’s direct role in the 
Republic’s security. Likewise, the purpose of Venetian silviculture was to produce a 
forest with specimens suitable for the Arsenale. The Venetians fixed their timber problem 
by manipulating mainland law at the expense of local timber users.  
Local communities immediately reacted to Venetian timber policies by skirting 
around the 1476 law. As aforementioned, forest users near the Montello used the church 
within the reserve as an excuse to enter the forest with felling tools. As Appuhn asserted, 
if the Venetians upset local communities enough, harvesters simply sabotaged the 
harvest.254 The distrust of the Venetian reserve system by local forest users illustrates that 
all forest users should be incorporated within the development of forest policy. American 
foresters encountered a similar problem in the early twentieth century when an elite class 
of technically trained scientists governed the usage of Western national forests.  
Like the Venetians, early Americans concerned themselves with specific species 
of oak. Ship-timber was a key resource for the newly founded Republic. Shipwrights 
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specifically sought out suitable specimens of Southern Live Oak (Quercus virens).255 
Congress also reserved stands of timber in the early nineteenth century in order to 
provide timber to the naval yards at Philadelphia and Boston.256 Although the 
conservation of timber resources in America began well before the twentieth century, the 
first federal system of American forest reserves did not develop until the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
The creation of America’s forest reserves in 1891 also came at the expense of 
local forest users. Industry’s reaction to the creation of National Forests is well 
documented by historians, but little scholarship examines how the new forests affected 
localized forest usage.257 The Forest Management Act of 1897 (Organic Act) restricted 
grazing, harvesting, and mining, all of which were typical usage patterns for western 
forests of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. The new timber policy 
disgusted miners and, especially, ranchers who secured concessions within the Organic 
Act.258  
In a similar fashion to fifteenth century Trevisans, American ranchers refused to 
allow bureaucrats to modify their rights to timberland. “Eastern college men,” like 
William Greeley, now dictated forest usage to ranchers.259 Here the question was not 
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“Who owns the Forest?” but “Who can use the Forest?” Livestock owners far 
outnumbered commercial harvest operations during this era.260 However, American 
ranchers succeeded where Trevisan peasants could not by securing grazing rights to 
federal forestland with a permit system. Such broad comparisons are often problematic, 
but can serve as a viable avenue for future directions of research.  
Examining the history of American forests elicits some similarities between the 
Terraferma narrative and the American colonial experience as well. The British of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries essentially used the American colonies for timber in 
a similar fashion as Venice utilized Terraferma’s timber resources. Robert Albion’s 
Forests and Sea Power examined the role forests and forest policy played in the English 
Navy from the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell to the battle of Hampton 
Roads.261 The preservation of American oaks and pines concerned the British Naval 
Board. Parliament, according to Albion, passed several laws to preserve American timber 
for the production of war vessels in Boston.262 The loss of the American colonies forced 
the British to look to other sources for shiptimber.  One of these foreign sources was 
Italy. During the Napoleonic wars, the Italian states harvested their timber for the British 
and French fleets.263 British reliance on Italian timber was so crucial that by 1814 “nearly 
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half of the oak on hand in the dockyards was from Italy.”264 The British sought timber 
from abroad due to the mismanagement and denudation of its native oaks.265 
Investigating the Arsenale’s role in the denudation of the Po River Valley is 
another future avenue for further research. A subsection of forest histories devote 
themselves solely to examining the occurrence of denudation of Mediterranean forests. 
J.V. Thirgood asserted that the exploitation of forest resources for ship-timber resulted in 
regional deforestation.266 The major focus of Thirgood’s study was the Levant and 
Cyprus, yet he addressed the importance of timber in the ascendancy of Venice by 
stating, “the Italian maritime states of Venice, Genoa and other cities…were launched at 
the expense of Mediterranean forests.”267 More specifically, Venetian maritime might 
was launched at the expense of Terraferma communities. Control of the timber supplies 
of the Po River Valley was essential to Venetian power. Studying the Arsenale’s 
dependency on mainland supplies of timber can answer questions about Venice’s 
political relationship with the polities of Terraferma. 
Russell Meiggs’s Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World 
established a solid foundation for recent inquires into forest histories. Mieggs’s work on 
ancient timber builds upon the research of Lionel Casson and R.C. Anderson by adding 
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forest history into the narrative of trireme construction.268 He does not blame the classical 
civilizations for overharvesting most of the Mediterranean forests. Certain regions like 
Attica and Sicily were deforested, but Mieggs asserts that wide portions of the 
Mediterranean Basin were well forested after the Classical era.269 He argues that ship-
building and land conversion in the Renaissance and Early Modern periods resulted in 
more wide spread deforestation than during the classical era. This regional approach to 
Mediterranean forests is a more appropriate way to examine Venice’s impact on its 
mainland forests.  
One of the best models of forest history is found altogether outside of European 
history. Conrad Totman charted the progression of early modern Japanese forest law in 
The Green Archipelago. Early modern Japan is an excellent example of a non-European 
state responding to forest issues in a similar manner to Venice. Like Venice, Japan did 
not fit the capitalist-driven environment of colonial New England put forth by William 
Cronon and Carolyn Merchant.270  Totman asserts that changes in agricultural practices 
resulted in an increased use of forest products.271 A similar pattern occurred in Venice 
and was coupled with deforestation. Totman correctly asserts that “excessive 
deforestation manifests itself in two ways: as wood scarcity and as environmental 
deterioration.”272 The Venetian sources suggest that ship-timber was a scarce resource 
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that required protection for the sake of Venetian security. Environmental deterioration is 
much harder to wring out of the sources.  
A. T. Grove and Oliver Rackham staunchly oppose the basin-wide model of 
Mediterranean deforestation. Grove and Rackham propose that the purported 
deforestation in the Classical era and the Renaissance is part of a larger Mediterranean 
“ruined landscape” myth. The ruined landscape myth can best be summarized as thus: in 
the classical era, human use and pastoral livestock permanently deforested virgin stands 
of Mediterranean forest. The deforestation caused severe soil erosion and the former lush 
forestlands became as sterile as the thin soils of Illyria. 273 Although grossly simplified, 
Grove and Rackham directly challenge J. Donald Hughes’s narrative of classical 
environmental history.274  
Grove and Rackham challenged the basin-wide deforestation narrative through 
their examination of ship-timber harvests throughout the Mediterranean in the 
Renaissance era. They assert that the evidence for the decline in oaks in Terraferma is 
inconclusive. The Venetians were simply outcompeted due to their outdated ship designs, 
“poor dock layout, corrupt workforce, and inefficient management.”275 Grove and 
Rackham are excellent scholars and produced praiseworthy scholarship on environmental 
change in England and Crete, but their assertions on Venice do not match what the 
primary sources elicit about Venice’s timber situation. The Venetians were at the 
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forefront of new ship designs, and possessed an extremely efficient dock layout.276 Grove 
and Rackham have neglected many of the Venetian primary sources that bluntly state that 
Venice was experiencing a famine of ship oak.277  
My initial research suggests that regional deforestation of ship-timber is the most 
appropriate model for pre-industrial Italy. Since the Venetian sources almost exclusively 
focus on ship-timber, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate overall 
forest health. Deforestation of ship-timber certainly occurred in the Venetian hinterland, 
but it is unwise to underestimate the resiliency of Mediterranean forests. The regional 
deforestation of Venice’s timber resources is an overlooked factor that determined the 
longevity of the Republic. However, larger economic and agricultural forces shifted the 
Mediterranean trade networks against Venice. Silk’s movement west and the introduction 
of maize removed Venice’s role as the middleman of the Mediterranean.278 
Recent scholars have also argued that regional deforestation in Renaissance Italy 
is part of a widespread scarcity of oak throughout the Mediterranean basin. Faruk Tabak 
asserted that regional deforestation of ship-timber species in Terraferma forced the 
Venetians to seek timber from further afield. The scarcity of Venetian oaks was a smaller 
part of a general decline in oaks throughout the Mediterranean basin.279 According to 
Tabak, deforestation was largely caused by new eastern crops changing agricultural land 
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use patterns throughout the basin, coupled with a spike in population in between 1450-
1560.280 
Studying the development of Venetian forest law also illustrated a need for more 
inquiries into how forests influenced earlier historical narratives. The aforementioned 
work by Russell Meiggs is the definitive work on ancient forests and timber. More 
recently, Eugene Borza successfully illustrated that Athenian dependency of Macedonian 
timber revealed the economic and political ties between Athens and Macedon.281 
Likewise, Lukas Thommen incorporated chapters devoted to Ancient forests in his An 
Environmental History of the Ancient Greece and Rome.282 
Access to suitable supplies of timber appears to have encouraged the Athenians to 
involve themselves with Macedon between the end of the second Greco-Persian War and 
the start of the Second Peloponnesian War (the pentekontiaetia). According to 
Theophrastus, the best species of conifers for all uses was the Silver Fir (Abies alba).283 
The Athenians constructed their triremes largely from conifers. The Spartans targeted 
Athens’ supply of timber in a similar fashion as they destroyed Athenian wheat crops.284 
Brasidas’ decision to harvest timber near the Strymon for Spartan ships exacerbated the 
defeat at Amphipolis in 422 BCE.285 Jason, the capable cavalry commander of Pherai, 
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later summarized Athenian timber needs by stating, “Consider now if I estimate rightly in 
these matters also. For if we possess Macedon, the place from which the Athenians obtain 
their timber, we will be able to build many more ships than they can.”286 Although the 
environment did not shape the ancient narrative alone, natural resources, especially 
timber, exerted a perceivable influence on human actions. 
A new environmental history of Venice is required to fully understand the 
Venetian narrative. The domination of timber, water, salt, and wheat allowed Venice to 
control Terraferma and the Adriatic. Each resource cannot be written out of the Venetian 
narrative. The strategic outlook of the Venetian Empire cast its guise not only on the rich 
waters of the east, but also the fertile forests of the Po River Valley.  
Venetian wars with mainland polities and the Ottoman Empire helped to shape the 
composition of Northeastern Italy’s forests. The Venetian forest narrative illustrates that 
warfare directly impacts environmental systems. Modern warfare in troubled regions 
such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan also shapes the sustainability of natural resources. 
War is a constant theme in the human narrative and the development of Venetian forest 
law provides historians with another window into how the environment and natural 
resources can possess agency in historical events. Although there is an undeniable loss of 
human life in conflicts, historians must also consider how military conflicts affect 
resources that sustain societies.  
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